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Abstract
Advanced methods of theory of optimal guaranteeing control and techniques of general-
ized (viscosity, minimax) solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi equations are applied to nonzero
sum game interaction between two large groups (coalitions) of agents (participants) aris-
ing in economic and biological evolutionary models. Random contacts of agents from
different groups happen according to a control dynamical process which can be inter-
preted as Kolmogorov’s differential equations in which coefficients describing flows are
not fixed a priori and can be chosen on the feedback principle. Payoffs of coalitions are
determined by the functionals of different types on infinite horizon. The notion of a dy-
namical Nash equilibrium is introduced in the class of control feedbacks. A solution based
on feedbacks maximizing with the guarantee the own payoffs (guaranteeing feedbacks)
is proposed. Guaranteeing feedbacks are constructed in the framework of the theory of
generalized solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi equations. The analytical formulas are obtained
for corresponding value functions. The equilibrium trajectory is generated by guaran-
teeing feedbacks and its properties are investigated. The considered approach provides
new qualitative results for the equilibrium trajectory in evolutionary models. The first
striking result consists in the fact that the designed equilibrium trajectory provides better
(in some bimatrix games strictly better) index values for both coalitions than trajecto-
ries which converge to static Nash equilibria (as, for example, trajectories of classical
models with the replicator dynamics). The second principle result implies both evolu-
tionary and revolutionary properties of the equilibrium trajectory: evolution takes place
in the characteristic domains of Hamilton-Jacobi equations and revolution at switching
curves of guaranteeing feedbacks. The third specific feature of the proposed solution is
the “positive” nature of guaranteeing feedbacks which maximize the own payoff unlike the
“negative” nature of punishing feedbacks which minimize the opponent payoff and lead
to static Nash equilibrium. The fourth concept takes into account the foreseeing principle
in constructing feedbacks due to the multiterminal character of payoffs in which future
states are also evaluated. The fifth idea deals with the venturous factor of the equilibrium
trajectory and prescribes the risk barrier surrounding it. These results indicate promising
applications of theory of guaranteeing control for constructing solutions in evolutionary
models.
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Introduction
We consider a model of evolutionary nonzero sum game between two coalitions of par-
ticipants in the framework of differential games theory (see [Krasovskii, Subbotin, 1988],
[Krasovskii, 1985]) using, especially, some ideas of the approach for nonantagonistic prob-
lems (see [Kleimenov, 1993]), statements and methods of analysis of evolutionary games
proposed in [Kryazhimskii, 1994]). We concentrate our attention on constructing dynami-
cal Nash equilibria and guaranteeing feedbacks which maximize corresponding payoffs. We
obtain resolving trajectories which give better results than solutions of classical models.
The dynamics of game interaction is related to differential (see [Isaacs, 1965]) and evo-
lutionary game-theoretical models (see [Friedman, 1991], [Young, 1993], [Nelson, Winter,
1982], [Intriligator, 1971] [Hofbauer, Sigmund, 1988]), [Basar, Olsder, 1982] [Vorobyev,
1985], [Kaniovskii, Young, 1994]. Random contacts of participants are represented by a
control dynamical process in which corresponding probabilities form the phase vector and
informational signals play the role of control parameters. This dynamics can be interpreted
as generalization of the well-known Kolmogorov’s equations which arise in some stochastic
models of mathematical economics and queueing theory. The generalization consists in
introducing control parameters instead of fixed coefficients which describe incoming and
outgoing flows within coalitions. The process evolves on the infinite interval of time. Pay-
offs of participants are specified by payoff matrixes. Payoffs of coalitions are defined as
average payoffs of participants (payoff mean values). We consider different types of these
mean values: terminal - for a fixed time; multiterminal - for a time interval; global termi-
nal - for a limit on the infinite time interval; global integral - for a limit of integral payoffs
on the infinite time interval. Note that non-zero sum games with discounting integral
payoffs were analyzed in [Tarasyev, 1994]. The global functionals are connected with the
foreseeing concept which takes into account not only local terminal interests of coalitions
but is oriented also on the global future change.
We introduce the notion of a dynamical Nash equilibrium in the class of control feed-
backs. Note that feedbacks generated by classical “punishing” solutions of static bimatrix
games give the natural and elementary example of a Nash equilibrium in the dynamical
sense. The nature of these feedbacks is antagonistic: they minimize the opponent payoff
and don’t maximize the own one.
*The work is partially supported by the Russian Fund for Fundamental Research (97-01-00161).
**The work is partially supported by the Russian Fund for Fundamental Research (96-01-00219, 96-15-
96245, 97-01-00161).
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We propose another approach which is based on the “guaranteeing” concept and pro-
vides better results than classical solutions. This new solution is generated by construc-
tions of the theory of positional differential games and involves guaranteeing feedbacks of
auxiliary zero sum games (see [Krasovskii, Subbotin, 1988], [Kleimenov, 1993]). We con-
sider these zero sum games in the framework of the theory of viscosity (minimax) solutions
of Hamilton-Jacobi equations (see [Subbotin, 1980, 1991, 1995], [Crandall, Lions, 1983,
1984]). We construct analytically value functions and optimal guaranteeing feedbacks
and verify the corresponding necessary and sufficient conditions for them formulated in
terms of conjugate derivatives [Subbotin, Tarasyev, 1985]. The synthesis of guaranteeing
feedbacks is determined by switching curves (generated by value functions) for control
signals.
Stress once again that guaranteeing feedbacks maximize with the guarantee payoffs of
coalitions in contrast to classical static strategies which punish each other by minimiz-
ing opponent payoffs. We generate equilibrium trajectories using these switching curves.
Equilibrium trajectories have evolutionary properties as well as revolutionary one. An
evolution takes place when equilibrium trajectories develop along the characteristics of
Hamilton-Jacobi equations and a revolution happens on switching curves where coalitions
change their behaviors. We consider the venturous factor of equilibrium trajectories and
prescribe the risk barrier surrounding it.
The behavior of new equilibrium solutions generated by bang-bang control synthesis
differs qualitatively from the evolution of trajectories of classical models with the replicator
dynamics. Remind that these trajectories converge a fortiori to a static Nash equilibrium
or circulate in its neighborhood (see [Young, 1993], [Nelson and Winter, 1982], [Hofbauer,
Sigmund, 1988]). The new equilibrium solutions are disposed in the intersection of do-
mains in which the payoffs values are better than the corresponding values calculated at
a static Nash equilibrium. Examples of “almost antagonistic” games show that these tra-
jectories converge to the points of intersection of switching curves - to the “new” points
of equilibrium with better index values.
1 Nonzero Sum Evolutionary Game. Dynamical Nash Equi-
librium
1.1 Dynamics, Payoff Functionals
Let us consider the system of differential equations which describes behavioral dynamics
for two coalitions (populations)
x˙ = −x + u
y˙ = −y + v (1.1)
Assume that parameter x, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 is the probability of the fact that a randomly
taken individual of the first coalition holds the first strategy (respectively, (1 − x) is the
probability of playing the second one). Parameter y, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1 is the probability of
choosing the first strategy by an individual of the second coalition (respectively, (1 − y)
is the probability of playing the second strategy). Control parameters u and v satisfy the
restrictions 0 ≤ u ≤ 1, 0 ≤ v ≤ 1 and can be interpreted as signals for individuals to
change their strategies. For example, the value u = 0 (v = 0) corresponds to the signal:
“change the first strategy for the second one”, the value u = 1 (v = 1) corresponds to
the signal: “change the second strategy for the first one” and the value u = x (v = y)
corresponds to the signal: “keep previous strategies”.
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Let us note that the ground for dynamics (1.1) and its properties were developed in
[Kryazhimskii, 1994], [Tarasyev, 1994]. In this dynamics we generalized Kolmogorov’s
differential equations assuming that coefficients of incoming and outgoing flows inside
coalitions are not given a priori and can be designed in the control process on the feedback
principle.
For interpretations of dynamics (1.1) let us consider the game interaction of two large
group of firms (or their capital investments) on two markets. Let x be a part of facilities
which firms of the first coalition (it may be a financial or industrial group) invest into
the first market (it may be a market of currencies, goods or new technologies [Vorobyev,
1985], [Kaniovskii, Young, 1994]) and (1− x) - into the second market respectively. Let y
be a part of facilities which the second coalition invests into the first market and (1− y)
- into the second one. Assume that activity of coalitions on the markets can be regulated
by managing councils. Managing councils using control parameters u and v can influence
on the distribution of facilities x and y. The dynamics of this influence is described by
the system (1.1) and provides some inertness (or independence) of firms with respect to
control signals u, v since velocities x˙, y˙ of changing of distributions x, y are not proportional
directly to signals but depend on distributions. For example, the first equation in (1.1)
means that according to the signal u = 0 distribution x decreases with the diminishing
velocity x˙ = −x.
We assume that the payoff of a participant from the first coalition is described by the
payoff matrix A = {aij}, and the payoff of a participant from the second one - by the
payoff matrix B = {bij}.
Specifically, for the game of firms on two markets we can consider the following situa-
tion. Assume that the first market is more profitable for investments than the second one
and so the following relations hold for payoff matrixes A and B
a11 > a2j, a12 > a21
b12 > b2j, b11 > b22, j = 1, 2
Let us suppose also that firms of the first coalition are stronger than firms of the second
one. They try to conquer both markets and hence the payoff matrix A has the dominating
main diagonal
aii > aij , i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2
Firms of the second coalition try to avoid interactions on the same market with firms
of the first coalition and, therefore, the payoff matrix B has the dominating secondary
diagonal
bij > bii, i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2
The terminal payoff functionals of coalitions are defined as mathematical expectations
corresponding to payoff matrixes A, B and can be interpreted as “local” interests of
coalitions (populations)
gA(x(T ), y(T )) = a11x(T )y(T ) + a12x(T )(1− y(T )) +
a21(1− x(T ))y(T ) + a22(1− x(T ))(1− y(T )) =
CAx(T )y(T )− α1x(T )− α2y(T ) + a22 (1.2)
gB(x(T ), y(T )) = b11x(T )y(T ) + b12x(T )(1− y(T )) +
b21(1− x(T ))y(T ) + b22(1− x(T ))(1− y(T )) =
CBx(T )y(T )− β1x(T )− β2y(T ) + b22 (1.3)
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at a given instant T . Here parameters CA, α1, α2 and CB, β1, β2 are determined according
to the classical theory of bimatrix games (see, for example, [Vorobyev, 1985])
CA = a11 − a12 − a21 + a22
α1 = a22 − a12
α2 = a22 − a21 (1.4)
CB = b11 − b12 − b21 + b22
β1 = b22 − b12
β2 = b22 − b21 (1.5)
We define “global” interests J∞A , J
∞
B of coalitions (populations) as multifunctions
generated by lower and upper limits of mean values
J∞A = [J
−
A , J
+
A ] (1.6)
J−A = J
−
A (x(·), y(·)) = lim inft→∞
gA(x(t), y(t))
J+A = J
+
A (x(·), y(·)) = lim sup
t→∞
gA(x(t), y(t))
J∞B = [J
−
B , J
+
B ] (1.7)
J−B = J
−
B (x(·), y(·)) = lim inft→∞
gB(x(t), y(t))
J+B = J
+
B (x(·), y(·)) = lim sup
t→∞
gB(x(t), y(t))
calculated on the trajectories (x(·), y(·)) of the system (1.1).
Consider an evolutionary nonzero sum game with the dynamics (1.1) and payoffs
(1.6),(1.7). There is an approach (see, for example, [Krasovskii, Subbotin, 1988],
[Kleimenov, 1993]) in the differential games theory for constructing equilibrium solutions
in the class of feedback strategies U = u(t, x, y, ε), V = v(t, x, y, ε) for nonzero sum prob-
lems. This approach is based on solving auxiliary zero sum games. In connection with
our statements of the problem (see functionals (1.6),(1.7)) we consider zero sum games
with the functionals J−A , J
+
A , J
−
B , J
+
B . It is known that zero sum problems can be solved
and resolving feedbacks can be constructed on the principle of dynamical programming.
This principle requires finding value functions. Below we obtain corresponding solutions
- value functions and optimal feedbacks for all considered problems in the framework of
the theory of generalized (minimax, viscosity) solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi equations.
1.2 Definition of Dynamical Nash Equilibria
Following [Kleimenov, 1993], [Kryazhimskii, 1994] we introduce the notion of a dynamical
Nash equilibrium in the class of closed-loop strategies (feedbacks) U = u(t, x, y, ε), V =
v(t, x, y, ε) for the nonzero sum game with the dynamics (1.1) and multivalued payoff
functionals (1.6),(1.7).
Definition 1.1 Let ε > 0 and (x0, y0) ∈ [0, 1]×[0, 1]. A pair of feedbacks U0 = u0(t, x, y, ε),
V 0 = v0(t, x, y, ε) is called a Nash equilibrium for an initial position (x0, y0) if for any
other feedbacks U = u(t, x, y, ε), V = v(t, x, y, ε) the following condition holds: for all
trajectories
(x0(·), y0(·)) ∈ X(x0, y0, U
0, V 0), (x1(·), y1(·)) ∈ X(x0, y0, U, V
0)
(x2(·), y2(·)) ∈ X(x0, y0, U
0, V )
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the inequalities
J−A (x
0(·), y0(·)) ≥ J+A (x1(·), y1(·))− ε (1.8)
J−B (x
0(·), y0(·)) ≥ J+B (x2(·), y2(·))− ε (1.9)
are valid.
1.3 The Auxiliary Zero-Sum Games
To construct desired equilibrium feedbacks U0, V 0 we use the approach of [Kleimenov,
1993]. According to this approach, we compose an equilibrium with the help of optimal
feedbacks constructed for zero-sum differential games ΓA = Γ
−
A ∪ Γ
+
A and ΓB = Γ
−
B ∪ Γ
+
B
with the payoffs J∞A (1.6) and J
∞
B (1.7). In the game ΓA the first coalition maximizes
with the guarantee the functional J−A (x(·), y(·)) using a feedback U = u(t, x, y, ε), and the
second coalition attempts, on the contrary, to minimize the functional J+A (x(·), y(·)) using
a feedback V = v(t, x, y, ε). Conversely, in the game ΓB the second coalition maximizes
with the guarantee the functional J−B (x(·), y(·)), and the first coalition minimizes the
functional J+B (x(·), y(·)).
Let us introduce the following notations. By u0A = u
0
A(t, x, y, ε) and v
0
B = v
0
B(t, x, y, ε)
denote feedbacks solving, respectively, the problem of guaranteeing maximization of the
payoff functionals J−A , J
−
B . Note that these feedbacks perform guaranteeing maximization
of the long term coalitions benefits and, therefore, can be called “positive” ones. By
u0B = u
0
B(t, x, y, ε) and v
0
A = v
0
A(t, x, y, ε) we denote feedbacks mostly unfavorable for the
opposite coalitions; namely, those minimizing the payoff functionals J+B , J
+
A of the opposite
coalitions respectively. These feedbacks can be called “punishment” feedbacks.
Let us note that inflexible solutions of the indicated problems can be obtained in the
framework of the classical theory of bimatrix games. Really, assume for the definiteness
that
CA > 0, CB < 0
0 < xA =
α2
CA
< 1, 0 < xB =
β2
CB
< 1
0 < yA =
α1
CA
< 1, 0 < yB =
β1
CB
< 1
One can prove the following statement.
Proposition 1.1 Differential games Γ−A, Γ
+
A have equal values
v−A = v
+
A = vA =
a22CA − α1α2
CA
(1.10)
and differential games Γ−B , Γ
+
B have equal values
v−B = v
+
B = vB =
b22CB − β1β2
CB
(1.11)
for any initial position (x0, y0) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1]. These values may be guaranteed, for
example, by “positive” feedbacks uclA, v
cl
B corresponding to classical static solutions xA, yB
u0A = u
cl
A = u
cl
A(x, y) =


0 if xA < x ≤ 1
1 if 0 ≤ x < xA
[0, 1] if x = xA
(1.12)
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v0B = v
cl
B = v
cl
B(x, y) =


0 if yB < y ≤ 1
1 if 0 ≤ y < yB
[0, 1] if y = yB
(1.13)
“Punishment” feedbacks are determined by formulas
u0B = u
cl
B = u
cl
B(x, y) =


0 if xB < x ≤ 1
1 if 0 ≤ x < xB
[0, 1] if x = xB
(1.14)
v0A = v
cl
A = v
cl
A(x, y) =


0 if yA < y ≤ 1
1 if 0 ≤ y < yA
[0, 1] if y = yA
(1.15)
and correspond to classical static solutions xB, yA which generate a static Nash equilibrium
NE = (xB, yA).
Remark 1.1 Note that “positive” feedbacks (1.12),(1.13) are rather inflexible because they
are obtained in the static model of bimatrix games and don’t take into account information
about dynamics (1.1). Our main goal is to construct flexible “positive” feedbacks which
essentially use information about dynamics.
Remark 1.2 Values of payoff functions gA(x, y), gB(x, y) coincide at points (xA, yB),
(xB, yA)
gA(xA, yB) = gA(xB, yA) = vA, gB(xA, yB) = gB(xB, yA) = vB (1.16)
But the point NE = (xB, yA) is a “mutually punishing” Nash equilibrium and the point
xA, yB does not have equilibrium properties in the corresponding static game.
1.4 Construction of Nash Equilibria
Let us construct now a Nash equilibrium pair of feedbacks by pasting together “positive”
feedbacks u0A, v
0
B and “punishment” feedbacks u
0
B, v
0
A.
Let us choose an initial position (x0, y0) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] and an accuracy parameter
ε > 0. Choose a trajectory (x0(·), y0(·)) ∈ X(x0, y0, u
0
A(·), v
0
B(·)) generated by “positive”
feedbacks u0A = u
0
A(t, x, y, ε) and v
0
B = v
0
B(t, x, y, ε). Let Tε > 0 be such that
gA(x
0(t), y0(t)) > J−A (x
0(·), y0(·))− ε
gB(x
0(t), y0(t)) > J−B (x
0(·), y0(·))− ε
t ∈ [Tε,+∞)
Denote by uεA(t) : [0, Tε) → [0, 1], v
ε
B(t) : [0, Tε) → [0, 1] step-by-step realizations of
strategies u0A, v
0
B such that the corresponding step-by-step motion (xε(·), yε(·)) satisfies
the condition
max
t∈[0,Tε]
‖(x0(t), y0(t))− (xε(t), yε(t))‖ < ε
Using the approach of [Kleimenov, 1993] one can prove the following statement.
Proposition 1.2 The pair of feedbacks U0 = u0(t, x, y, ε), V 0 = v0(t, x, y, ε) pasting
together “positive” feedbacks u0A, v
0
B and “punishment” feedbacks u
0
B, v
0
A in accordance
with formulas
U0 = u0(t, x, y, ε) =
{
uεA(t) if ‖(x, y)− (xε(t), yε(t))‖ < ε
u0B(x, y) otherwise
(1.17)
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V 0 = v0(t, x, y, ε) =
{
vεB(t) if ‖(x, y)− (xε(t), yε(t))‖ < ε
v0A(x, y) otherwise
(1.18)
is a dynamical Nash ε-equilibrium
Remark 1.3 Let us note that the number ε can be interpreted as a parameter of “reliance”
of coalitions to each other or a level of “risk” which the coalitions admit in the game. This
parameter determines the risk barrier surrounding the equilibrium trajectory (xε(·), yε(·)).
Coalitions either follow the equilibrium trajectory not leaving the prescribed risk barrier and
then they obtain better index values or they violate it and then “punishment” strategies
give worse results.
Remark 1.4 Consider trajectories which can be generated by a dynamical Nash equilib-
rium (1.17), (1.18) with inflexible classical feedbacks (1.12)-(1.15). If trajectory
(xpos(·), ypos(·)) evolves according to “positive” strategies uclA, v
cl
B (1.12), (1.13) then it con-
verges to the new equilibrium point (xA, yB). If coalitions punish each other by strategies
uclB , v
cl
A (1.14),(1.15) then trajectory (x
pun(·), ypun(·)) converges to a static Nash equilib-
rium (xB, yA). But values of functionals (1.6), (1.7) are equal in both cases (see Remark
1.3).
J∞A (x
pos(·), ypos(·)) = J∞A (x
pun(·), ypun(·)) = vA
J∞B (x
pos(·), ypos(·)) = J∞B (x
pun(·), ypun(·)) = vB
Below we construct flexible “positive” feedbacks which generate trajectories (xfl(·), yfl(·))
converging to the “better” positions than inflexible dynamical equilibria (xB, yA), (xA, yB)
by both criteria J∞A (x
fl(·), yfl(·)) ≥ vA, J
∞
B (x
fl(·), yfl(·)) ≥ vB . To this end in Section 2
we consider auxiliary zero sum games with terminal payoffs and obtain for them complete
solutions. In Section 3 we construct lower envelopes of value functions of terminal games
and deduce solutions for auxiliary multiterminal games. In Section 4 we derive flexible
“positive” feedbacks from the structure of value functions of multiterminal games.
2 The Analytical Solution of the Differential Game with the
Terminal Functional
2.1 Value Functions and Generalized Solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi Equa-
tions
In this section we consider auxiliary zero sum terminal differential games with dynamics
(1.1) and payoff functionals (1.2) and (1.3) respectively. Further solutions of terminal
differential games will be used for constructing foreseeing feedbacks by calculating low
envelopes for multiterminal functionals. The value functions wi(T, t, x, y), i = 1, 2 of
terminal games are determined as values of corresponding maximin (minimax) operations
w1(T, t0, x0, y0) = max
u(t,x,y)
min
(x1(·),y1(·))
gA(x1(T ), y1(T )) =
min
v(t,x,y)
max
(x2(·),y2(·))
gA(x2(T ), y2(T )) (2.1)
w2(T, t0, x0, y0) = max
v(t,x,y)
min
(x2(·),y2(·))
gB(x2(T ), y2(T )) =
min
u(t,x,y)
max
(x1(·),y1(·))
gB(x1(T ), y1(T )) (2.2)
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for every initial position (t0, x0, y0). Here trajectories (x1(·), y1(·)) are generated by feed-
back controls u(t, x, y, ε) and arbitrary behaviors v(t), trajectories (x2(·), y2(·)) are gener-
ated by feedback controls v(t, x, y, ε) and arbitrary behaviors u(t) from the initial position
(t0, x0, y0).
The value functions wi(T, t, x, y), i = 1, 2 satisfy the principle of dynamical program-
ming which implies the existence of nondecreasing and nonincreasing directions accessible
for the dynamical system at every current position (the so-called properties of u and v
stability of the value function). At points where the value functions are differentiable these
properties turn into the first order partial differential equations of the Hamilton-Jacobi
type
∂w1
∂t
−
∂w1
∂x
x−
∂w1
∂y
y + max
0≤u≤1
∂w1
∂x
u + min
0≤v≤1
∂w1
∂y
v = 0 (2.3)
∂w2
∂t
−
∂w2
∂x
x−
∂w2
∂y
y + min
0≤u≤1
∂w2
∂x
u + max
0≤v≤1
∂w2
∂y
v = 0 (2.4)
The value functions wi(T, t, x, y), i = 1, 2 satisfy also the terminal boundary condition
when t = T
w1(T, T, x, y) = CAxy − α1x− α2y + a22 = gA(x, y) (2.5)
w2(T, T, x, y) = CBxy − β1x− β2y + b22 = gB(x, y) (2.6)
We consider now the terminal boundary-value problems (2.3),(2.5) and (2.4),(2.6) for
value functions w1(T, t, x, y), w2(T, t, x, y). We turn our attention to the first problem
(2.3),(2.5). It is known (see [Crandall, Lions, 1983, 1985], [Subbotin, 1980, 1991]) that the
value function w1(T, t, x, y) coincides with the generalized (minimax, viscosity) solution
of this problem which exists, is unique and determined by the terminal boundary value
condition (2.5) and the pair of differential inequalities for conjugate derivatives D∗w1 and
D∗w1 corresponding to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (2.3)
D∗w1(T, t, x, y)|(s)≥ H(x, y, s) (2.7)
D∗w1(T, t, x, y)|(s)≤ H(x, y, s) (2.8)
(t, x, y) ∈ [t0, T )× (0, 1)× (0, 1), s = (s1, s2) ∈ R
2
Conjugate derivatives D∗w1 and D∗w1 and the Hamiltonian H are given by formulas (see
[Subbotin, Tarasyev, 1985])
D∗w1(T, t, x, y)|(s) = sup
h∈R2
(〈s, h〉 − ∂−w1(T, t, x, y)|(1, h)) (2.9)
D∗w1(T, t, x, y)|(s) = inf
h∈R2
(〈s, h〉 − ∂+w1(T, t, x, y)|(1, h)) (2.10)
H(x, y, s) = −s1x− s2y + max
0≤u≤1
s1u+ min
0≤v≤1
s2v (2.11)
Here symbol 〈s, h〉 denotes the usual inner product of vectors s and h, symbols
∂−w1(T, t, x, y)|(1, h), ∂+w1(T, t, x, y)|(1, h) denote Dini directional derivatives of the value
function w1 at a point (t, x, y) in a direction (1, h), h= (h1, h2) ∈ R2
∂−w1(T, t, x, y)|(1, h) = lim inf
δ↓0
w1(T, t+ δ, x+ δh1, y + δh2)− w1(T, t, x, y)
δ
(2.12)
∂+w1(T, t, x, y)|(1, h) = lim sup
δ↓0
w1(T, t+ δ, x+ δh1, y + δh2)−w1(T, t, x, y)
δ
(2.13)
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For the piecewise smooth value function w1 directional derivatives and conjugate
derivatives can be calculated in the framework of nonsmooth and convex analysis. Let us
assume that in some neighborhood Oε(t∗, x∗, y∗) of a point (t∗, x∗, y∗) ∈ [t0, T )× (0, 1)×
(0, 1) the function w1 is given by formulas
w1(T, t, x, y) = min
i∈I
max
j∈J
ϕij(T, t, x, y) = max
j∈J
min
i∈I
ϕij(T, t, x, y) (2.14)
w1(T, t∗, x∗, y∗) = ϕij(T, t∗, x∗, y∗), i ∈ I, j ∈ J
Directional derivatives are determined in this case by relations
∂−w1(T, t∗, x∗, y∗)|(1, h) = ∂+w1(T, t∗, x∗, y∗)|(1, h) = ∂w1(T, t∗, x∗, y∗)|(h) =
min
i∈I
max
j∈J
(aij + 〈bij, h〉) = max
j∈J
min
i∈I
(aij + 〈bij, h〉) (2.15)
aij =
∂ϕij
∂t
bij =
(
∂ϕij
∂x
,
∂ϕij
∂y
)
Assume
C =
⋂
i∈I
Bi, Bi = co{bij : j ∈ J}
D =
⋂
j∈J
Bj, Bj = co{bij : i ∈ I}
Conjugate derivatives are determined by relations
D∗w1(T, t∗, x∗, y∗)|(s) =
{
maxi∈I min{−
∑
j∈J λj(s)aij} if s ∈ C
+∞ otherwise
(2.16)
D∗w1(T, t∗, x∗, y∗)|(s) =
{
minj∈J max{−
∑
i∈I λi(s)aij} if s ∈ D
−∞ otherwise
(2.17)
Here coefficients λj(s) and λi(s) satisfy the relations∑
j∈J
λj(s)bij = s, λj(s) ≥ 0,
∑
j∈J
λj(s) = 1
∑
i∈I
λi(s)bij = s, λi(s) ≥ 0,
∑
i∈I
λi(s) = 1
2.2 The Description of the Analytical Solution for the Terminal Bound-
ary Value Problem
The terminal boundary value problem (2.3), (2.5) has the analytic solution. The cor-
responding value function w1(T, t, x, y) is piecewise smooth and consists of five smooth
functions ϕk(T, t, x, y), k = 1, ..., 5 which are pasted by operations of maximum and mini-
mum. Analytic formulas for smooth components ϕk(T, t, x, y), k = 1, ..., 5 can be obtained
via methods of characteristics for corresponding linear Hamilton-Jacobi equations which
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arise from the nonlinear one (2.3) by substituting different combinations of extremal values
0 and 1 into max and min expressions. Let us give formulas for these functions
ϕ1(T, t, x, y) = CAe
2(t−T )xy − α1e
(t−T )x − α2e
(t−T )y + a22 (2.18)
ϕ2(T, t, x, y) = CAe
2(t−T )xy − α1e
(t−T )x −
(CAe
2(t−T ) + (α2 −CA)e
(t−T ))y + α1e
(t−T ) + a12 (2.19)
ϕ3(T, t, x, y) = CAe
2(t−T )xy − (CAe
2(t−T ) + (α1 − CA)e
(t−T ))x−
(CAe
2(t−T ) + (α2 −CA)e
(t−T ))y +
CAe
2(t−T ) + (α1 + α2 − 2CA)e
(t−T ) + a11 (2.20)
ϕ4(T, t, x, y) = CAe
2(t−T )xy − (CAe
2(t−T ) + (α1 − CA)e
(t−T ))x−
−α2e
(t−T )y + α2e
(t−T ) + a21 (2.21)
ϕ5(T, t, x, y) =
a22CA − α1α2
CA
=
a11a22 − a12a21
CA
=
DA
CA
= vA (2.22)
Here vA is the value of the static matrix game. Functions ϕk, k = 1, ..., 5 are continuously
pasted together on four lines Lm = Lm(T, t), m = 1, ..., 4
L1 = {(x, y) : x1(T, t) ≤ x ≤ 1, y = y2(T, t)} (2.23)
L2 = {(x, y) : x = x1(T, t), y1(T, t) ≤ y ≤ 1} (2.24)
L3 = {(x, y) : 0 ≤ x ≤ x2(T, t), y = y1(T, t)} (2.25)
L4 = {(x, y) : x = x2(T, t), 0 ≤ y ≤ y2(T, t)} (2.26)
Here
x1(T, t) = max{0, 1− (1−
α2
CA
)e(T−t)}
x2(T, t) = min{1,
α2
CA
e(T−t)}
y1(T, t) = max{0, 1− (1−
α1
CA
)e(T−t)}
y2(T, t) = min{1,
α1
CA
e(T−t)} (2.27)
Let us give the description of the value function w1.
Proposition 2.1 The value function w1(T, t, x, y) is determined by the formula
w1(T, t, x, y) = ϕk(T, t, x, y), if (x, y) ∈ Dk(T, t), k = 1, ..., 5 (2.28)
Here domains Dk = Dk(T, t), k = 1, ..., 5 are given by inequalities
D1(T, t) = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : x2(T, t) ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 ≤ y ≤ y2(T, t)}
D2(T, t) = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : x1(T, t) ≤ x ≤ 1, y2(T, t) ≤ y ≤ 1}
D3(T, t) = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : 0 ≤ x ≤ x1(T, t), y1(T, t) ≤ y ≤ 1}
D4(T, t) = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : 0 ≤ x ≤ x2(T, t), 0 ≤ y ≤ y1(T, t)}
D5(T, t) = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : x1(T, t) ≤ x ≤ x2(T, t),
y1(T, t) ≤ y ≤ y2(T, t)} (2.29)
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Remark 2.1 Some of domains Dk, k = 1, ..., 5 can be empty. In the case when
0 < xA =
α2
CA
< 1, 0 < yA =
α1
CA
< 1 (2.30)
all domains Dk, k = 1, ..., 5 have nonempty interior during the finite interval of time
(Tf , T ],
Tf = max{tx1 , tx2, ty1, ty2} (2.31)
tx1 = max{t : x1(T, t) = 0}
tx2 = max{t : x2(T, t) = 1}
ty1 = max{t : y1(T, t) = 0}
ty2 = max{t : y2(T, t) = 1}
Then interior parts of domains D1, D2, D3, D4 disappear at the corresponding moments
tx2 , ty2 , tx1, ty1 and the value function w1(T, t, x, y) becomes equal to the constant
w1(T, t, x, y) = ϕ5 =
DA
CA
= vA (2.32)
( t ≤ Td, (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] )
Td = min{tx1, tx2, ty1, ty2} (2.33)
On Fig.1 lines Lm, m = 1, ..., 4 and domains Dk, k = 1, ..., 5 are shown for the case when
xA = 0.6, yA = 0.4, e
(T−t) = 1.5.
2.3 Verification of Differential Inequalities in the Terminal Boundary
Value Problem
Let us prove that the necessary and sufficient conditions (2.5), (2.7), (2.8) are valid for
the function w1(T, t, x, y) determined by formulas (2.28), (2.29).
Proof.
It is obvious that the terminal boundary value condition (2.5) is fulfilled for the function
w1(T, t, x, y). Let us verify that the function w1(T, t, x, y) satisfies differential inequalities
(2.7), (2.8). It is not difficult to convince oneself that functions ϕk(T, t, x, y), k = 1, ..., 5
satisfy Hamilton-Jacobi equation (2.3) at all internal points D0k = int{Dk} of domains Dk,
k = 1, ..., 5. It remains to verify inequalities (2.7), (2.8) at points of boundaries ∂Dk of
these domains, more precisely, at points of lines Lm(T, t), m = 1, ..., 4. Let us consider,
for example, a part
L121 = L
12
1 (T, t) = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : x2(T, t)< x ≤ 1, y = y2(T, t)}
of the line L1 at points of which functions ϕ1 and ϕ2 are pasted together (see Fig.1). We
calculate derivatives ∂ϕi/∂t, ∂ϕi/∂x, ∂ϕi/∂y, i = 1, 2 on L
12
1
∂ϕ1
∂t
= 2CAe
2(t−T )xy − α1e
(t−T )x− α2e
(t−T )y = α1e
(t−T )x−
α1α2
CA
∂ϕ1
∂x
= CAe
2(t−T )y − α1e
(t−T ) = 0
∂ϕ1
∂y
= CAe
2(t−T )x− α2e
(t−T )
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Figure 1: The structure of the value function w1 in the terminal problem.
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∂ϕ2
∂t
= 2CAe
2(t−T )xy − α1e
(t−T )x− 2CAe
2(t−T )y − (α2 −CA)e
(t−T )y
+α1e
(t−T ) = α1e
(t−T )x−
α1α2
CA
− α1(e
(t−T ) − 1)
∂ϕ2
∂x
= CAe
2(t−T )y − α1e
(t−T ) = 0
∂ϕ2
∂y
= CAe
2(t−T )x− (CAe
2(t−T ) + (α2 −CA)e
(t−T ))
One can see that partial derivatives ∂ϕ1/∂y and ∂ϕ2/∂y are connected at points of the
set L121 by inequalities
0 ≤
∂ϕ1
∂y
≤
∂ϕ2
∂y
Therefore, functions ϕ1 and ϕ2 are pasted on the line L
12
1 by the operation of the maximum
type. Thus, for function w1(T, t, x, y) the following relation
w1(T, t, x, y) = max{ϕ1(T, t, x, y), ϕ2(T, t, x, y)}
is valid in some neighborhood of the set L121 . Besides that, one can obtain the equalities
∂ϕ1
∂x
=
∂ϕ2
∂x
= 0
Hence, the directional derivative in a direction (1, h) = (1, h1, h2) is determined by the
formula
∂w1(T, t, x, y)|(1, h) = max{
∂ϕ1
∂t
+
∂ϕ1
∂y
h2,
∂ϕ2
∂t
+
∂ϕ2
∂y
h2}
Then for the conjugate derivatives we obtain relations
D∗w1(T, t, x, y)|(s) =
{
−λa1 − (1− λ)a2 if s1 = 0 and s2 = λb1+ (1− λ)b2
+∞ otherwise
D∗w1(T, t, x, y)|(s) = −∞
Here 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, ai = ∂ϕi/∂t, bi = ∂ϕi/∂y, i = 1, 2.
Let us remind that we need to verify the pair of conditions
D∗w1(T, t, x, y)|(s)≥ H(x, y, s)
D∗w1(T, t, x, y)|(s)≤ H(x, y, s)
It is obvious that the second inequality is fulfilled. Let us verify the first one. For the
vectors
s = (s1, s2), s1 = 0, s2 = λ
∂ϕ1
∂y
+ (1− λ)
∂ϕ2
∂y
we have relations
D∗w1(T, t, x, y)|(s) = (1− λ)α1(e
(t−T ) − 1)− α1e
(t−T )x+
α1α2
CA
H(x, y, s) = max
0≤u≤1
s1(−x+ u) + min
0≤v≤1
s2(−y + v) = −s2y =
(1− λ)α1(e
(t−T ) − 1)− α1e
(t−T )x+
α1α2
CA
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Hence, we obtain
D∗w1(T, t, x, y)|(s) = H(x, y, s)
for s ∈ dom{D∗w1}. Thus, differential inequalities (2.7),(2.8) are valid for the function
w1 on the set L
12
1 .
Let us verify conditions (2.7),(2.8) at points of one more typical pasting line. Consider
the set
L154 = L
15
4 (T, t) = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : x = x2(T, t), y1(T, t) ≤ y ≤ y2(T, t)}
where functions ϕ1 and ϕ5 are pasted together (see Fig.1). It is obvious that partial
derivatives of the function ϕ5 are equal to zero
∂ϕ5
∂t
=
∂ϕ5
∂x
=
∂ϕ5
∂y
= 0
As is easily seen the following inequality takes place
∂ϕ1
∂x
= CAe
2(t−T )y − α1e
(t−T ) ≤ 0 =
∂ϕ5
∂x
on the set L154 since y ≤ (α1e
(T−t))/CA for points (x, y) ∈ L154 . Therefore, functions ϕ1
and ϕ5 are pasted with the help of the minimum type operation
w1(T, t, x, y) = min{ϕ1(T, t, x, y), ϕ5(T, t, x, y)}
on the set L154 . Taking into account that
∂ϕ1/∂y = ∂ϕ5/∂y = 0
we obtain the following relations for the directional derivative on the line L154
∂w1(T, t, x, y)|(1, h) = min{0,
∂ϕ1
∂t
+
∂ϕ2
∂x
h1}
The conjugate derivatives are determined by formulas
D∗w1(T, t, x, y)|(s) = +∞
D∗w1(T, t, x, y)|(s) =
{
−λa1 − (1− λ)a5 if s2 = 0 and s1 = λb1 + (1− λ)b5
−∞ otherwise
Here ai = ∂ϕi/∂t, bi = ∂ϕi/∂x, i = 1, 5.
It is obvious that
D∗w1(T, t, x, y)|(s)≥ H(x, y, s), s ∈ R
2
Let us calculate the lower conjugate derivative D∗w1(T, t, x, y)|(s) and the Hamiltonian
H(x, y, s) on vectors
s = (s1, s2), s2 = 0, s1 = λ
∂ϕ1
∂x
+ (1− λ)
∂ϕ5
∂x
We have relations
D∗w1(T, t, x, y)|(s) = −λα2e
(t−T )y + λ
α1α2
CA
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H(x, y, s) = max
0≤u≤1
s1(−x + u) + min
0≤v≤1
s2(−y + v) =
−s1x = −λα2e
(t−T )y + λ
α1α2
CA
It is obvious that
D∗w1(T, t, x, y)|(s) = H(x, y, s)
for s ∈ dom{D∗w1}. Thus, differential inequalities (2.7), (2.8) are also fulfilled for the
function w1 on the set L
15
4 .
The conditions (2.7),(2.8) on other parts of lines Lm, m = 1, ..., 4 can be verified anal-
ogously. Thus, it is proved that the function w1(T, t, x, y) determined by formulas (2.28),
(2.29) is the generalized (viscosity, minimax) solution of the terminal boundary value
problem (2.3), (2.5) and, hence, it coincides with the value function of the corresponding
differential game (1.1),(1.2).
3 The Lower Envelope of Terminal Value Functions and the
Value Function of the Game with the Multiterminal Pay-
off Functional
3.1 The Differential Game with the Multiterminal Functional
In the previous section we have obtained the solution for the auxiliary terminal boundary
value problem (2.3),(2.5). The solution of this problem (the value function) w1(T, t, x, y)
depends on the terminal instant T . Of course, such a solution is not appropriate in the
evolutionary sense because we obtain a “good” result at a single moment T but not at other
times including infinity. Therefore, in this section we will construct the value function for
the differential game with the multiterminal payoff functional
GA(x(·), y(·)) = inf
t0≤t<+∞
gA(x(t), y(t)) (3.1)
The functional (3.1) determines the foreseeing principle since it takes into account future
states gA(x(t), y(t)) from time t0 till infinity +∞.
Using results of differential games theory (see [Krasovskii, Subbotin, 1988]) and via-
bility theory (see [Aubin, 1990]) one can prove that the zero-sum differential game with
the dynamics (1.1) and the payoff (3.1) has the value
Theorem 3.1 There exists the saddle point determining the stationary value function
sup
u(t,x,y,ε)
inf
(x1(·),y1(·))
inf
s∈[t0,+∞)
gA(x1(s), y1(s)) =
inf
v(t,x,y,ε)
sup
(x2(·),y2(·))
inf
s∈[t0,+∞)
gA(x2(s), y2(s)) =
lim
T→+∞
min
v(t,x,y,ε)
max
(x2(·),y2(·))
min
s∈[t0,T ]
gA(x2(s), y2(s)) =
lim
T→+∞
max
u(t,x,y,ε)
min
(x1(·),y1(·))
min
s∈[t0,T ]
gA(x1(s), y1(s)) =
wA(t0, x0, y0) = wA(x0, y0) (3.2)
Here trajectories (x1(·), y1(·)), (x2(·), y2(·)) are generated from the initial position (t0, x0, y0)
by feedback controls u(t, x, y, ε), v(t, x, y, ε) of maximizing and minimizing players respec-
tively and arbitrary controls of their opponents.
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Proof.
The proof follows from the theorem on alternative (see [Krasovskii, Subbotin, 1988]),
stationary property of dynamics (1.1), finiteness of values of functional GA (3.1) and can
be carried out via the notion of viability kernel (see [Aubin, 1990], [Sonnevend, 1981]).
The scheme of the proof is the following.
In the general case inequalities take place
sup
u(t,x,y,ε)
inf
(x1(·),y1(·))
inf
s∈[t0,+∞)
gA(x1(s), y1(s)) ≤
inf
v(t,x,y,ε)
sup
(x2(·),y2(·))
inf
s∈[t0,+∞)
gA(x2(s), y2(s)) ≤
lim
T→+∞
min
v(t,x,y,ε)
max
(x2(·),y2(·))
min
s∈[t0,T ]
gA(x2(s), y2(s)) =
lim
T→+∞
max
u(t,x,y,ε)
min
(x1(·),y1(·))
min
s∈[t0,T ]
gA(x1(s), y1(s)) =
wA(t, x, y) (3.3)
One can verify the following properties of the function wA(t, x, y) (3.3).
Proposition 3.1 The function wA is a stationary one (it does not depend on t). More
precisely,
wA(t, x, y) = wA(s, x, y) = wA(x, y) (3.4)
for all (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1], t ∈ R, s ∈ R.
Proposition 3.2 The function wA satisfies the Lipschitz condition
|wA(x1, y1)− wA(x2, y2)| ≤ K(|x1 − x2|+ |y1 − y2|) (3.5)
for all (xi, yi) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1], i = 1, 2.
Proposition 3.3 The function wA is majorized by the payoff gA
wA(x, y) ≤ gA(x, y), ( (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] ) (3.6)
Proposition 3.4 The function wA is the maximal function which satisfies inequality (3.6)
and is subjected to the principle of dynamical programming. The corresponding properties
of u-stability and v-stability can be represented in the infinitesimal form as
min
0≤v≤1
max
0≤u≤1
∂+wA(x, y)|(−x+ u,−y + v) ≥ 0 (3.7)
for all (x, y) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1), and
max
0≤u≤1
min
0≤v≤1
∂−wA(x, y)|(−x+ u,−y + v) ≤ 0 (3.8)
for all (x, y) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1) where wA(x, y) < gA(x, y). Here the directional derivatives
∂−wA(x, y)|(h1, h2), ∂+wA(x, y)|(h1, h2) of the function wA at a point (x, y) ∈ (0, 1)×(0, 1)
along a direction h = (h1, h2) are determined by
∂−wA(x, y)|(h1, h2) = lim inf
δ↓0
wA(x+ δh1, y + δh2)−wA(x, y)
δ
(3.9)
∂+wA(x, y)|(h1, h2) = lim sup
δ↓0
wA(x+ δh1, y + δh2)−wA(x, y)
δ
(3.10)
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Proposition 3.5 Properties of u-stability (3.7) and v-stability (3.8) can be rewritten (see,
for example, [Subbotin, Tarasyev, 1985]) in terms of conjugate derivatives
D∗wA(x, y)|(s) ≤ H(x, y, s) (3.11)
( (x, y) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1), s = (s1, s2) ∈ R
2 )
D∗wA(x, y)|(s)≥ H(x, y, s) (3.12)
( (x, y) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1), wA(x, y) < gA(x, y), s = (s1, s2) ∈ R
2 )
Here the conjugate derivatives D∗wA, D∗wA and the Hamiltonian H are determined by
D∗wA(x, y)|(s) = sup
h∈R2
(〈s, h〉 − ∂−wA(x, y)|(h)) (3.13)
D∗wA(x, y)|(s) = inf
h∈R2
(〈s, h〉 − ∂+wA(x, y)|(h)) (3.14)
H(x, y, s) = −s1x − s2y +max{0, s1}+min{0, s2} (3.15)
Taking into account stability (viability) properties and using the concept of “extremal
shift” strategy (see [Krasovskii, 1985]) one can prove that corresponding trajectories pro-
vide the value of functional GA (3.1) on [t0,+∞) equal to the value of function wA (3.2).
Hence, all inequalities in (3.3) turn into equalities and this fact proves Theorem 3.1.
The inverse result is also valid.
Proposition 3.6 Differential inequalities (3.7),(3.8) (or, equivalently, (3.11),(3.12)) to-
gether with the boundary condition (3.6) determine the value function wA uniquely. More
precisely, there exists the single maximal function which satisfies these conditions, and this
function coincides with wA.
Thus, either the set of Propositions 3.3,3.4,3.6 or the set of Propositions 3.3,3.5,3.6 provide
necessary and sufficient conditions for the value function wA.
Stability properties (3.7),(3.8) (or, equivalently, (3.11),(3.12)) are connected with the
stationary Hamilton-Jacobi equation.
Proposition 3.7 At points (x, y) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1) where wA(x, y) < gA(x, y) and wA is
differentiable, inequalities (3.7),(3.8) (or (3.11),(3.12)) turn into the stationary Hamilton-
Jacobi equation
−
∂wA
∂x
x−
∂wA
∂y
y +max{0,
∂wA
∂x
}+min{0,
∂wA
∂y
} = 0 (3.16)
For piecewise smooth functions we have the following stationary version of stability prop-
erties.
Proposition 3.8 If the value function wA is piecewise smooth then conjugate derivatives
(3.13),(3.14) are determined by
D∗wA(x∗, y∗)|(s) =
{
0 if s ∈ C
+∞ otherwise
(3.17)
D∗wA(x∗, y∗)|(s) =
{
0 if s ∈ D
−∞ otherwise
(3.18)
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Here
C =
⋂
i∈I
Bi, Bi = co{bij : j ∈ J}
D =
⋂
j∈J
Bj , Bj = co{bij : i ∈ I}
bij =
(
∂ϕij
∂x
,
∂ϕij
∂y
)
wA(x, y) = min
i∈I
max
j∈J
ϕij(x, y) = max
j∈J
min
i∈I
ϕij(x, y)
wA(x∗, y∗) = ϕij(x∗, y∗), i ∈ I, j ∈ J
(x, y) ∈ Oε(x∗, y∗)
And differential inequalities (3.11),(3.12) turn into formulas
0 ≤ −s1x− s2y +max{0, s1}+min{0, s2}
( (x, y) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1), s = (s1, s2) ∈ D )
0 ≥ −s1x− s2y +max{0, s1}+min{0, s2}
( (x, y) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1), wA(x, y) < gA(x, y), s = (s1, s2) ∈ C )
3.2 Description of a Solution to the Game with the Multiterminal Func-
tional
Before describing an analytic solution of the game in question, we introduce the envelopes
of the smooth components ϕ1, ϕ3 (2.18),(2.20) of the value function w1 (2.28) parametrized
by s = t−T . Low envelopes provide considering of multiterminal interests and introducing
foreseeing principle for designing feedbacks. To construct the envelope ψ1A of ϕ1 it is
necessary to calculate the derivative with respect to s, set it equal to zero, find the root
of the obtained equation, and substitute the root into ϕ1. Namely, we have
∂ϕ1
∂s
= 2CAe
2sxy − α1e
sx− α2e
sy = 0
es =
α1x+ α2y
2CAxy
ψ1A(x, y) = ϕ1(s, x, y) = a22 −
(α1x+ α2y)
2
4CAxy
(3.19)
Making the same with ϕ3 we obtain its lower envelope ψ
2
A with respect to s
∂ϕ3
∂s
= 2CAe
2sxy −
(CAe
2s + (α1 −CA)e
s)x− (CAe
2s + (α2 − CA)e
s)y +
CAe
2s + (α1 + α2 − 2CA)e
s = 0
es =
(α1 − CA)(x− 1) + (α2 −CA)(y − 1)
2CA(x− 1)(y− 1)
ψ2A(x, y) = ϕ3(s, x, y) = a11 −
((CA − α1)(1− x) + (CA − α2)(1− y))
2
4CA(1− x)(1− y)
(3.20)
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Similarly we define the lower envelopes ψ3A, ψ
4
A of smooth components φ2, φ4 (2.19),(2.21),
respectively
ψ3A(x, y) = CAxy − α1x− α2y + a22 (3.21)
ψ4A(x, y) =
a22CA − α1α2
CA
= vA (3.22)
The smooth functions ψiA, i = 1, ..., 4 are continuously pasted together along the
following lines K
j
A, j = 1, ..., 5
K1A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : x =
α2
CA
, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1}
K2A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] :
α2
CA
≤ x ≤ 1,
α1
CA
≤ y ≤ 1, y =
α1
α2
x}
K3A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : 0 ≤ x ≤
α2
CA
,
0 ≤ y ≤
α1
CA
, y = −
(CA − α1)
(CA − α2)
(1− x) + 1}
K4A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] :
α2
CA
≤ x ≤ 1,
0 ≤ y ≤
α1
CA
, y =
α1x
2CAx− α2
}
K5A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : 0 ≤ x ≤
α2
CA
,
α1
CA
≤ y ≤ 1, y = −
(CA − α1)(1− x)
2CA(1− x)− (CA − α2)
+ 1}
Let us pass to the analytic description of the value function wA.
Proposition 3.9 In the case when CA > 0 the value function (x, y)→ wA(x, y) is deter-
mined by
wA(x, y) = ψ
i
A(x, y), if (x, y) ∈ E
i
A, i = 1, ..., 4 (3.23)
Here the domains EiA, i = 1, ..., 4 are defined as follows
E1A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] :
α2
CA
≤ x ≤ 1,
α1x
2CAx− α2
≤ y ≤
α1
α2
x}
E2A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : 0 ≤ x ≤
α2
CA
,
−
(CA − α1)
(CA − α2)
(1− x) + 1 ≤ y ≤ −
(CA − α1)(1− x)
2CA(1− x)− (CA − α2)
+ 1}
E3A = E
31
A ∪ E
32
A
E31A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] :
α2
CA
≤ x ≤ 1,
0 ≤ y ≤
α1x
2CAx− α2
}
E32A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : 0 ≤ x ≤
α2
CA
,
−
(CA − α1)(1− x)
2CA(1− x)− (CA − α2)
+ 1 ≤ y ≤ 1}
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E4A = E
41
A ∪ E
42
A
E41A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] :
α2
CA
≤ x ≤ 1,
α1
α2
x ≤ y ≤ 1}
E42A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : 0 ≤ x ≤
α2
CA
,
0 ≤ y ≤ −
(CA − α1)
(CA − α2)
(1− x) + 1} (3.24)
On Fig.2 lines KjA, j = 1, ..., 5 and domains E
i
A, i = 1, ..., 4 are shown for the case when
CA = 5, α1 = 2, α2 = 3.
Remark 3.1 In the domain E4A the following relations hold
gA(x, y) ≥ wA(x, y) = vA (3.25)
Remark 3.2 The positional strategy U0A = u
0
A(x, y) corresponding to the value function
wA (see below relations (4.1)) provides viability of trajectories (x(·), y(·)) of the system
(1.1) in the domain E4A.
Remark 3.3 In the case when CA < 0 the value function (x, y)→ wA(x, y) is determined
by relations
wA(x, y) = ψ
i
A(x, y), if (x, y) ∈ E
i
A, i = 1, ..., 4 (3.26)
ψ1A(x, y) = a21 +
((CA − α1)x+ α2(1− y))
2
4CAx(1− y)
ψ2A(x, y) = a12 +
(α1(1− x) + (CA − α2)y)2
4CA(1− x)y
ψ3A(x, y) = CAxy − α1x− α2y + a22
ψ4A(x, y) = vA
Here the domains EiA, i = 1, ..., 4 are defined as follows
E1A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] :
α2
CA
≤ x ≤ 1,
−
(CA − α1)
α2
x+ 1 ≤ y ≤ −
(CA − α1)x
2CAx− α2
+ 1}
E2A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : 0 ≤ x ≤
α2
CA
,
α1(1− x)
2CA(1− x)− (CA − α2)
≤ y ≤
α1
(CA − α2)
(1− x)}
E3A = E
31
A ∪E
32
A
E31A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] :
α2
CA
≤ x ≤ 1,
−
(CA − α1)x
2CAx− α2
+ 1} ≤ y ≤ 1
E32A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : 0 ≤ x ≤
α2
CA
,
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0 ≤ y ≤
α1(1− x)
2CA(1− x)− (CA − α2)
+ 1}
E4A = E
41
A ∪E
42
A
E41A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] :
α2
CA
≤ x ≤ 1,
0 ≤ y ≤ −
(CA − α1)
α2
x+ 1}
E42A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : 0 ≤ x ≤
α2
CA
,
α1
(CA − α2)
(1− x) ≤ y ≤ 1} (3.27)
Remark 3.4 For the matrix B the value function wB can be determined analogously. In
the case when CB > 0 the value function (x, y)→ wB(x, y) is determined by relations
wB(x, y) = ψ
i
B(x, y), if (x, y) ∈ E
i
B, i = 1, ..., 4 (3.28)
ψ1B(x, y) = b22 −
(β1x+ β2y)
2
4CBxy
ψ2B(x, y) = b11 −
((CB − β1)(1− x) + (CB − β2)(1− y))2
4CB(1− x)(1− y)
ψ3B(x, y) = CBxy − β1x− β2y + b22
ψ4B(x, y) = vB =
b22CB − β1β2
CB
Here domains EiB, i = 1, ..., 4 are defined as follows
E1B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] :
β1
CB
≤ y ≤ 1,
β2y
2CBy − β1
} ≤ x ≤
β2
β1
y}
E2B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : 0 ≤ y ≤
β1
CB
,
−
(CB − β2)
(CB − β1)
(1− y) + 1 ≤ x ≤ −
(CB − β2)(1− y)
2CB(1− y)− (CB − β1)
+ 1}
E3B = E
31
B ∪E
32
B
E31B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] :
β1
CB
≤ y ≤ 1,
0 ≤ x ≤
β2y
2CBy − β1
}
E32B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : 0 ≤ y ≤
β1
CB
,
−
(CB − β2)(1− y)
2CB(1− y)− (CB − β1)
+ 1 ≤ x ≤ 1}
E4B = E
41
B ∪E
42
B
E41B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] :
β1
CB
≤ y ≤ 1,
β2
β1
y ≤ x ≤ 1}
–22 –
E42B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : 0 ≤ y ≤
β1
CB
,
0 ≤ x ≤ −
(CB − β2)
(CB − β1)
(1− y) + 1} (3.29)
In the case when CB < 0 the value function (x, y)→ wB(x, y) is determined by relations
wB(x, y) = ψ
i
B(x, y), if (x, y) ∈ E
i
B, i = 1, ..., 4 (3.30)
ψ1B(x, y) = b12+
(β1(1− x) + (CB − β2)y)
2
4CB(1− x)y
ψ2B(x, y) = b21+
((CB − β1)x+ β2(1− y))2
4CBx(1− y)
ψ3B(x, y) = CBxy − β1x− β2y + b22
ψ4B(x, y) = vB
Here domains EiB, i = 1, ..., 4 are defined as follows
E1B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] :
β1
CB
≤ y ≤ 1,
−
(CB − β2)
β1
y + 1 ≤ x ≤ −
(CB − β2)y
2CBy − β1
+ 1}
E2B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : 0 ≤ y ≤
β1
CB
,
β2(1− y)
2CB(1− y)− (CB − β1)
≤ x ≤
β2
(CB − β1)
(1− y)}
E3B = E
31
B ∪E
32
B
E31B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] :
β1
CB
≤ y ≤ 1,
−
(CB − β2)y
2CBy − β1
+ 1 ≤ x ≤ 1}
E32B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : 0 ≤ y ≤
β1
CB
,
0 ≤ x ≤
β2(1− y)
2CB(1− y)− (CB − β1)
}
E4B = E
41
B ∪E
42
B
E41B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] :
β1
CB
≤ y ≤ 1,
0 ≤ x ≤ −
(CB − β2)
β1
y + 1}
E42B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : 0 ≤ y ≤
β1
CB
,
β2
(CB − β1)
(1− y) ≤ x ≤ 1} (3.31)
3.3 Testing u− and v− Stability for the Multiterminal Game
In this section we prove that for function wA defined by (3.23),(3.24) the necessary and
sufficient conditions for being the value of the multiterminal game, i.e. the boundary
condition (3.6) and the differential inequalities (3.11),(3.12), are fulfilled.
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Proof.
The boundary condition is obviously fulfilled because functions ψiA, i = 1, ..., 4 are the
lower envelopes of the terminal solution w1(T, t, x, y) and, hence,
ψiA(x, y) ≤ φi(t, t, x, y) ≤ gA(x, y), ( i = 1, ..., 4, (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] )
Let us verify now that differential inequalities (3.11),(3.12) are valid for the function
wA. It is not difficult to prove that functions ψ
i
A, i = 1, 2, 4, (3.19),(3.20),(3.22) satisfy
the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (3.16) at internal points of domains EiA, i = 1, 2, 4. One
can verify that function ψ3A (3.21) coincides with the boundary function gA and satisfies
the inequality
−
∂ψ3A
∂x
x−
∂ψ3A
∂y
y +max{0,
∂ψ3A
∂x
}+min{0,
∂ψ3A
∂y
} ≥ 0
at internal points of the domain E3A.
It remains to check differential inequalities (3.11),(3.12) on lines KjA, j = 1, ..., 5. Let
us do it on lines K2A, K
3
A (see Fig.2). At points of the line K
2
A functions ψ
1
A and ψ
4
A are
continuously pasted together. Let us calculate partial derivatives of these functions
∂ψ1A
∂x
=
α21x
2 − α22y
2
4CAx2y
∂ψ1A
∂y
=
α21x
2 − α22y
2
4CAxy2
∂ψ4A
∂x
= 0
∂ψ4A
∂y
= 0
As is easily seen these derivatives are equal to zero on line K2A
∂ψ1A
∂x
=
∂ψ4A
∂x
= 0,
∂ψ1A
∂y
=
∂ψ4A
∂y
= 0
In other words functions ψ1A and ψ
4
A are pasted together smoothly and continuously. Hence,
relations (3.11),(3.12) on K2A are fulfilled as equality (3.16) (see Proposition (3.7)). Anal-
ogously one can prove smooth pasting of functions ψ2A, ψ
4
A which leads to (3.11),(3.12) in
form (3.16) on line K3A.
Consider now line K4A (see Fig.2) where functions ψ
1
A and ψ
3
A are pasted together. It
can be verified that pasting is smooth. For partial derivatives calculated on line K4A we
have
∂ψ1A
∂x
=
∂ψ3A
∂x
=
α1(α2 −CAx)
2CAx− α2
∂ψ1A
∂y
=
∂ψ3A
∂y
= CAx− α2
Smooth pasting means that function wA satisfies Hamilton-Jacobi equation on line K
4
A.
One can similarly verify smoothness of function wA on line K
5
A.
Along the last line K1A (see Fig.2) functions ψ
3
A and ψ
4
A are pasted together. Their
derivatives on K1A are determined by
∂ψ3A
∂x
= CAy − α1,
∂ψ4A
∂x
= 0
∂ψ3A
∂y
=
∂ψ4A
∂y
= 0
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Figure 2: The structure of the value function wA in the multiterminal problem.
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Note that since wA = ψ
3
A = ψ
4
A = gA on line K
1
A, we need to verify only condition (3.11).
As it is easily seen, in a small neighborhood of line K1A we have
wA(x, y) = min{ψ
3
A(x, y), ψ
4
A(x, y)}
Hence for points (x, y) ∈ K1A we obtain (see (3.10),(3.14))
∂wA(x, y)|(h1, h2) = min{0, (CAy − α1)h1}
D∗wA(x, y)|(s1, s2) =
{
0 if s1 = λ(CAy − α1) and s2 = 0
−∞ otherwise
(3.32)
Here 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. For points (x, y) ∈ K1A and vectors s = (s1, s2), s1 = λ(CAy−α1), s2 = 0
the Hamiltonian H(x, y, s) is determined by
H(x, y, s) = −s1x+max{0, s1} ={
−s1x if s1 ≤ 0
s1(1− x) otherwise
It is clear that for these values the Hamiltonian is larger or equal than the lower conjugate
derivative (3.32). Hence, inequality (3.11) on line K1A is proved.
We have verified conditions (3.11),(3.12) for the function wA at all points of the square
[0, 1]× [0, 1]. Thus, we have proved that the function wA (3.23),(3.24) is the value function
in the game with the multiterminal functional.
4 Flexible “Positive” Feedback Controls Generated by Value
Functions of Multiterminal Games
4.1 Description of Optimal Feedback Controls
Let us give the description of the flexible “positive” feedback control u0A = u
fl
A = u
fl
A (x, y)
which solves the problem of guaranteeing maximization for the multiterminal functional
GA(x1(·), y1(·)) (3.1) on the trajectories (x1(·), y1(·)) of the system (1.1). This maximizing
feedback is constructed via “extremal shift” principle in the direction of the gradient
(generalized gradient) of the value function wA and takes into account its foreseeing nature.
It is not difficult to verify that partial derivative ∂wA/∂x of the value function wA
changes its sign on lines K2A and K
3
A (see Fig.2). Therefore, the optimal feedback control
u0A has the following structure (see, for example, [Krasovskii, Subbotin, 1988]). The control
parameter uflA = u
fl
A (x, y) is equal to zero if the current position (x, y) = (x1(t), y1(t)) lies
on the right from the line KA = K
2
A ∪K
3
A, it is equal to unit if the current position lies
on the left from this line and it can take arbitrary values at points of line KA. Namely, if
CA > 0 then
u0A = u
fl
A = u
fl
A (x, y) =


0 if (x, y) ∈ D1A
1 if (x, y) ∈ D2A
∈ [0, 1] if (x, y) ∈ KA
(4.1)
D1A = D
11
A ∪D
12
A
D11A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y <
α1
α2
x, y ≥
α1
CA
}
D12A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y < −
(CA − α1)
(CA − α2)
(1− x) + 1, y ≤
α1
CA
}
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D2A = D
21
A ∪D
22
A
D21A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y >
α1
α2
x, y ≥
α1
CA
}
D22A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y > −
(CA − α1)
(CA − α2)
(1− x) + 1, y ≤
α1
CA
}
KA = K
2
A ∪K
3
A
K2A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y =
α1
α2
x, y ≥
α1
CA
}
K3A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y = −
(CA − α1)
(CA − α2)
(1− x) + 1, y ≤
α1
CA
} (4.2)
On Fig.3 the switch line KA and domains D
1
A, D
2
A are depicted. Directions of velocity
x˙ in domains D1A, D
2
A are shown by arrows.
If CA < 0 then the flexible “positive” feedback u
fl
A has the structure (4.1) where the
switching line KA and the domains D
1
A, D
2
A are determined by
D1A = D
11
A ∪D
12
A
D11A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y >
α1
(CA − α2)
(1− x), y ≥
α1
CA
}
D12A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y > −
(CA − α1)
α2
x+ 1, y ≤
α1
CA
}
D2A = D
21
A ∪D
22
A
D21A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y <
α1
(CA − α2)
(1− x), y ≥
α1
CA
}
D22A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y < −
(CA − α1)
α2
x+ 1, y ≤
α1
CA
}
KA = K
2
A ∪K
3
A
K2A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y =
α1
(CA − α2)
(1− x), y ≥
α1
CA
}
K3A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y = −
(CA − α1)
α2
x+ 1, y ≤
α1
CA
} (4.3)
The problem of guaranteeing optimization of the multiterminal functionalGB(x2(·), y2(·))
for the second coalition is solved analogously. The flexible “positive” feedback control
v0B = v
fl
B = v
fl
B (x, y) has the structure similar to (4.1). Namely, if CB > 0 then the
optimal feedback vflB is described by
v0B = v
fl
B = v
fl
B (x, y)


0 if (x, y) ∈ D1B
1 if (x, y) ∈ D2B
∈ [0, 1] if (x, y) ∈ KB
(4.4)
D1B = D
11
B ∪D
12
B
D11B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y >
β1
β2
x, x ≥
β2
CB
}
D12B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y > −
(CB − β1)
(CB − β2)
(1− x) + 1, x ≤
β2
CB
}
D2B = D
21
B ∪D
22
B
D21B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y <
β1
β2
x, x ≥
β2
CB
}
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Figure 3: The synthesis of the flexible “positive” feedback control uflA .
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D22B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y < −
(CB − β1)
(CB − β2)
(1− x) + 1, x ≤
β2
CB
}
KB = K
2
B ∪K
3
B
K2B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y =
β1
β2
x, x ≥
β2
CB
}
K3B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y = −
(CB − β1)
(CB − β2)
(1− x) + 1, x ≤
β2
CB
} (4.5)
If CB < 0 then the optimal feedback v
fl
B is determined by (4.4) where the switching line
KB and the domains D
1
B, D
2
B are given by
D1B = D
11
B ∪D
12
B
D11B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y > −
(CB − β1)
β2
x+ 1, x ≥
β2
CB
}
D12B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y >
β1
(CB − β2)
(1− x), x ≤
β2
CB
}
D2B = D
21
B ∪D
22
B
D21B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y < −
(CB − β1)
β2
x+ 1, x ≥
β2
CB
}
D22B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y <
β1
(CB − β2)
(1− x), x ≤
β2
CB
}
KB = K
2
B ∪K
3
B
K2B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y = −
(CB − β1)
β2
x+ 1, x ≥
β2
CB
}
K3B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y =
β1
(CB − β2)
(1− x), x ≤
β2
CB
} (4.6)
4.2 The Value Provided by Optimal Feedbacks for Multiterminal Payoffs
The optimal feedback uflA (x, y) (4.1) guarantees that the current payoff to the first coalition
becomes in the long term no worse than the value vA = DA/CA, CA > 0 of the zero-sum
matrix game for the matrix A (call it the A-matrix game). Note that this result is not
obviously worse than the value of the function wA
vA ≥ wA(x, y), ∀(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]
More precisely, the following statement is true.
Proposition 4.1 For any initial position (x0, y0) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] and any trajectory
(x1(·), y1(·)) ∈ X(x0, y0, u
fl
A ), x1(t0) = x0, y1(t0) = y0, t0 = 0
generated by the optimal feedback control u
fl
A = u
fl
A (x, y) there exists a finite time ts ∈
[0, TA]
TA = ln(max{
CA
α2
,
CA
CA − α2
})
such that at this time the trajectory (x1(·), y1(·)) enters into the domain E
4
A (see (3.24) or
(3.27))
(x1(ts), y1(ts)) ∈ E
4
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where the value function wA is equal to the the value vA of the A-matrix game
wA(x1(ts), y1(ts)) = vA,
and remains in the domain E4A on the time interval [ts,+∞) (and, hence, on the time
interval [TA,+∞)) (see (3.23),(3.24) and Remark (3.2)). Therefore, according to the
definition (3.2) of the value function wA the following inequality takes place
gA(x1(t), y1(t)) ≥ vA, ( t ≥ ts ) (4.7)
and, in particular,
lim inf
t→+∞
gA(x1(t), y1(t)) ≥ vA (4.8)
Proof. Note that the domain E4A (see (3.24) or (3.27) has nonempty intersections with
all lines Lλ, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1
Lλ = {(x, y) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1) : y = λ}
Hence, any possible trajectory (x1(·), y1(·)) generated by the optimal feedback u
fl
A (the
values of which are equal to zero or to unit) crosses this domain E4A because the projection
of velocity on lines Lλ for such trajectories is not equal to zero and conserves the sign till
the moment of intersection of the trajectory with the domain E4A.
The analogous statement can be formulated for B-matrix game.
Proposition 4.2 For any initial position (x0, y0) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] and any trajectory
(x2(·), y2(·)) ∈ X(x0, y0, v
fl
B ), x2(t0) = x0, y2(t0) = y0, t0 = 0
generated by the optimal feedback control vflB = v
fl
B (x, y) (4.4) there exists a finite time
ts ∈ [0, TB]
TB = ln(max{
CB
β1
,
CB
CB − β1
})
such that at this time the trajectory (x2(·), y2(·)) enters into the domain E4B (see (3.29)
or (3.31))
(x2(ts), y2(ts)) ∈ E
4
B
where the value function wB is equal to the the value vB of the B-matrix game
wB(x2(ts), y2(ts)) = vB,
and remains in the domain E4B on the time interval [ts,+∞) (and, hence, on the time
interval [TB,+∞)). Therefore, according to the definition of the value function wB the
following inequality takes place
gB(x2(t), y2(t)) ≥ vB , ( t ≥ ts ) (4.9)
and, in particular,
lim inf
t→+∞
gB(x2(t), y2(t)) ≥ vB (4.10)
Propositions 4.1, 4.2 imply the following statement.
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Proposition 4.3 The intersection E0 of sets E4B and E
4
B is not empty
E0 = E4A ∩E
4
B 6= ∅ (4.11)
and, hence, optimal strategies uflA , v
fl
B generate the trajectory (x
fl(·), yfl(·)) which enters
the intersection E0 and remains in it on the time interval [T 0,+∞), T 0 = max{TA, TB}.
In the set E0 the inequalities
gA(x
fl(t), yfl(t)) ≥ vA, gB(x
fl(t), y(flt)) ≥ vB , t ∈ [T
0,+∞) (4.12)
are fulfilled. Therefore, the set E0 can be called the favorable domain for both coalitions.
On Fig.4 domains E4A, E
4
B, E
0 are shown for the game with the following payoff matrixes
A =
(
5 3
2 5
)
(4.13)
CA = a11 − a12 − a21 + a22 = 5
α1 = a22 − a12 = 2
α2 = a22 − a21 = 3
xA =
α2
CA
= 0.6, yA =
α1
CA
= 0.4
B =
(
2 5
3 1
)
(4.14)
CB = b11 − b12 − b21 + b22 = −5
β1 = b22 − b12 = −4
β2 = b22 − b21 = −2
xB =
β2
CB
= 0.4, yB =
β1
CB
= 0.8
Directions of velocity x˙ for the first coalition are depicted by horizontal arrows and
directions of velocity y˙ for the second one - by vertical arrows.
Note that matrixes A (4.13) and B (4.14) correspond to the game of firms interacting
on two markets which was described in Section 1.
5 A Nash Equilibrium with Flexible “Positive” Feedbacks
of Multiterminal Games
5.1 The Structure of a Nash Equilibrium
Let us construct now a Nash equilibrium pair of feedbacks by pasting together flexible
“positive” feedbacks u0A = u
fl
A , v
0
B = v
fl
B (4.1), (4.4) and “punishment” feedbacks u
0
B = u
cl
B,
v0A = v
cl
A (1.14), (1.15). Let us choose an initial position (x0, y0) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] and an
accuracy parameter ε > 0. Choose a trajectory (xfl(·), yfl(·)) ∈ X(x0, y0, u
fl
A (·), v
fl
B (·))
generated by flexible “positive” feedbacks u
fl
A and v
fl
B . Let Tε > 0 be such that
gA(x
fl(t), yfl(t)) > J−A (x
fl(·), yfl(·))− ε
gB(x
fl(t), yfl(t)) > J−B (x
fl(·), yfl(·))− ε
t ∈ [Tε,+∞)
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Figure 4: The portrait of guaranteeing feedbacks uflA , v
fl
B and the Nash equilibrium tra-
jectory TR = (xfl(·), yfl(·)).
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Denote by ufl,εA (t) : [0, Tε) → [0, 1], v
fl,ε
B (t) : [0, Tε) → [0, 1] step-by-step realizations of
strategies uflA , v
fl
B such that the corresponding step-by-step motion (x
fl
ε (·), y
fl
ε (·)) satisfies
the condition
max
t∈[0,Tε]
‖(xfl(t), yfl(t))− (xflε (t), y
fl
ε (t))‖ < ε
Proposition 5.1 A pair of feedbacks U0 = u0(t, x, y, ε), V 0 = v0(t, x, y, ε) pasting to-
gether flexible “positive” feedbacks uflA , v
fl
B (4.1), (4.4) and “punishment” feedbacks u
cl
B,
vclA (1.14), (1.15) in accordance with Proposition 1.2
U0 = u0(t, x, y, ε) =
{
ufl,εA (t) if ‖(x, y)− (x
fl
ε (t), y
fl
ε (t))‖ < ε
uclB(x, y) otherwise
(5.1)
V 0 = v0(t, x, y, ε) =
{
vfl,εB (t) if ‖(x, y)− (x
fl
ε (t), y
fl
ε (t))‖ < ε
vclA(x, y) otherwise
(5.2)
is a dynamical Nash ε-equilibrium.
Let us remind that the trajectory (xflε (·), y
fl
ε (·)) constitutes the core of the dynamical
Nash equilibrium. Therefore, it can be called the equilibrium trajectory. It is generated
by guaranteeing feedbacks uflA and v
fl
B and so provides better index values than at a static
Nash equilibrium with the guarantee. This trajectory is surrounded by the risk ε-barrier
which gives the possibility for trusting and venturing.
5.2 Trajectories Generated by Flexible “Positive” Feedbacks
The qualitative behavior of trajectories generated by flexible “positive” feedbacks which
form the basis of the dynamical Nash equilibrium (5.1),(5.2) is the question of great
interest. The complete classification of possible limit points, attractors, cycles or chaotic
circulation could form the theme of the future analysis. Preliminary, we can propose the
following statement.
Proposition 5.2 The values of the payoff functionals J−A , J
−
B on an arbitrary trajectory
(xfl(·), yfl(·)) generated by flexible “positive” feedback controls uflA , v
fl
B (4.1), (4.4) are
no worse than the values of these functionals on any trajectory converging to the static
Nash equilibrium (xB, yA) = (β2/CB, α1/CA) whose components have the sense of coali-
tions’ distributions mostly unfavorable for the opposite coalition. According to Propositions
4.1-4.3 trajectories (xfl(·), yfl(·)) enter the favorable domain E0 and stay in it on the in-
finite time interval. There are the following possible qualitative behaviors of the trajectory
(xfl(·), yfl(·)) in the favorable domain E0: - it can converge to an intersection point of
switching lines KA, KB;
- it can tend to points situated on the boundary of the square (in the case when the inter-
section of lines KA, KB is empty);
- it can tend to nonantagonistic static Nash equilibria (in the case when such equilibria
exist);
- it can simply circulate in the favorable domain E0.
For example, on Fig.4 one of the cases mentioned in Proposition 5.2 is shown for the
game with the payoff matrixes A (4.13) and B (4.14). The trajectory TR = (xfl(·), yfl(·))
generated by flexible “positive” feedbacks uflA , v
fl
B starts from the initial position IP =
(0.7, 0.1) and moves at first along the straight line to the corner (0, 1) of the unit square
[0, 1]× [0, 1]. Then it contacts the switching line KA. Next it moves along the line KA
and further to the corner (1, 1) till the meeting with the switching line KB. After that
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it evolves along the line KB on the border of the domain E
0 altering velocity directions
from the corner (1, 1) to the corner (1, 0) till arriving to the point IS = KA
⋂
KB of
intersection of the switching lines KA, KB. Note that here we give description of the
trajectories behavior in the domain E0 up to the value of the accuracy parameter ε.
Remark 5.1 Note that the “punishment” feedbacks uclB , v
cl
A (1.14),(1.15) being compo-
nents of the dynamical Nash equilibrium (5.1),(5.2) lead trajectories to the unfavorable
static Nash equilibrium (xB, yA).
Remark 5.2 Using constructions of flexible “positive” feedbacks we obtain the unexpected
striking result: the equilibrium trajectory TR = (xfl(·), yfl(·)) provides better (in the given
example strictly better) index values for both coalitions than index values at static Nash
equilibrium (xB, yA). Hence, the equilibrium trajectory has better properties than trajec-
tories of classical models with replicator and best response dynamics which converge or
circulate around static Nash equilibrium (xB, yA).
6 Quasioptimal Feedbacks in Games with Integral Payoff
Functionals
6.1 Nash Equilibria in the Nonzero-Sum Differential Game with the
Averaged Integral Functionals
In this section we consider the nonzero sum differential game of two coalitions with the
averaged integral payoff functionals
JI∞A = [JI
−
A , JI
+
A ] (6.1)
JI−A = JI
−
A (x(·), y(·)) = lim inf
T→∞
1
(T − t∗)
∫ T
t∗
gA(x(t), y(t))dt
JI+A = JI
+
A (x(·), y(·)) = lim sup
T→∞
1
(T − t∗)
∫ T
t∗
gA(x(t), y(t))dt
JI∞B = [JI
−
B , JI
+
B ] (6.2)
JI−B = JI
−
B (x(·), y(·)) = lim inf
T→∞
1
(T − t∗)
∫ T
t∗
gB(x(t), y(t))dt
JI+B = JI
+
B (x(·), y(·)) = lim sup
T→∞
1
(T − t∗)
∫ T
t∗
gB(x(t), y(t))dt
determined on the trajectories (x(·), y(·)) of the system (1.1).
The averaged integral functionals (6.1), (6.2) are traditional for problems of evolution-
ary economics and biological evolution. Unlike the multiterminal payoffs (3.1) they allow
to loose on some intervals in order to win on others and to obtain the better summa-
rized result. This property provides another character of switching curves in guarantee-
ing feedbacks which give the opportunity for longer staying in profitable domains where
gA(x, y) > vA, gB(x, y) > vB.
We introduce the notion of dynamical Nash equilibrium for the evolutionary game with
the integral functionals (6.1), (6.2) in the same context as for the game with functionals
(1.6), (1.7)
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Definition 6.1 A dynamical Nash equilibria (U0, V 0), U0 = u0(t, x, y, ε), V 0 = v0(t, x, y, ε)
in the class of feedback controls U = u(t, x, y, ε), V = v(t, x, y, ε) for this problem are de-
fined analogously to Definition 1.1 by inequalities
JI−A (x
0(·), y0(·)) ≥ JI+A (x1(·), y1(·))− ε (6.3)
JI−B (x
0(·), y0(·)) ≥ JI+B (x2(·), y2(·))− ε (6.4)
(x0(·), y0(·)) ∈ X(x0, y0, U
0, V 0), (x1(·), y1(·)) ∈ X(x0, y0, U, V
0)
(x2(·), y2(·)) ∈ X(x0, y0, U
0, V )
Proposition 6.1 A dynamical Nash equilibrium (U0, V 0) can be constructed according to
Proposition 1.2. Namely, in Sections 6.2, 6.3 we find solutions of auxiliary two-step opti-
mal control problems and obtain switching curves MA (6.20),(6.21), MB (6.23),(6.24) for
“positive” dual-step feedbacks u0A = u
ds
A (x, y), v
0
B = v
ds
B (x, y) maximizing integral payoff
functionals (6.1),(6.2). Then we paste these “positive” feedbacks udsA , v
ds
B with “punish-
ment” feedbacks uclB , v
cl
A (1.14),(1.15) according to the scheme (1.17),(1.18) and obtain a
Nash equilibrium (U0, V 0).
6.2 Two-step Optimal Control Problems
In order to construct “positive” feedbacks u0A = u
ds
A (x, y), v
0
B = v
ds
B (x, y) we consider in this
section the auxiliary two-step optimal control problem with the integral payoff functional
for the first coalition when actions of the second coalition are the most unfavorable. More
precisely, we analyze the optimal control problem for the dynamical system (1.1)
x˙ = −x+ u, x(0) = x0
y˙ = −y + v, y(0) = y0
with the payoff functional
JfA =
∫ Tf
0
gA(x(t), y(t))dt (6.5)
We determine the terminal instant Tf = Tf(x0, y0) later.
Let us assume for definiteness that the following conditions hold
CA > 0, vA =
DA
CA
= 0
0 < xA =
α2
CA
< 1, 0 < yA =
α1
CA
< 1 (6.6)
We consider the case when initial conditions (x0, y0) for the system (1.1) satisfy relations
x0 = xA, y0 > yA (6.7)
Let us suppose that actions of the second coalition are the most unfavorable for the first
coalition. For the trajectories of the system (1.1) starting from the initial positions (x0, y0)
(6.7) these actions v0A = v
cl
A(x, y) are rather simple
vclA(x, y) ≡ 0 (6.8)
The optimal actions u0A = u
ds
A (x, y) of the first coalition with respect to the payoff func-
tional JfA in this situation can be represented as the two-step bang-bang control: it is
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equal to unit from the initial instant t0 = 0 till the optimal switch instant s and then it is
equal to zero till the final instant Tf
u0A(t) = u
ds
A (x(t), y(t)) =
{
1 if t0 ≤ t < s
0 if s ≤ t < Tf
(6.9)
The parameter s here is the parameter of optimization. The final instant Tf is determined
by the condition that a trajectory (x(·), y(·)) of the system (1.1) starting from the line
where x(t0) = xA returns to this line x(Tf) = xA.
Thus, we consider two aggregates of characteristics. The first one is described by the
system of differential equations
x˙ = −x+ 1
y˙ = −y (6.10)
solutions of which are determined by the Cauchy formula
x(t) = (x0 − 1)e
−t + 1
y(t) = y0e
−t (6.11)
where initial positions (x0, y0) satisfy conditions (6.7) and time parameter t satisfies in-
equality 0 ≤ t < s.
The second aggregate of characteristics is given by the system of differential equations
x˙ = −x
y˙ = −y (6.12)
solutions of which are determined by the Cauchy formula
x(t) = x1e
−t
y(t) = y1e
−t (6.13)
where initial positions (x1, y1) = (x1(s), y1(s)) are determined by relations
x1 = x1(s) = (x0 − 1)e
−s + 1
y1 = y1(s) = y0e
−s (6.14)
and time parameter t satisfies inequality 0 ≤ t < p. Here the final moment of time p = p(s)
and the final position (x2, y2) = (x2(s), y2(s)) of the whole trajectory (x(·), y(·)) are given
by formulas
x1e
−p = xA, p = p(s) = ln
x1(s)
xA
x2 = xA
y2 = y1e
−p (6.15)
The optimal control problem consists in finding such moment of time s and corre-
sponding switching point (x1, y1) = (x1(s), y1(s)) on the trajectory (x(·), y(·)) that the
integral I = I(s) attains the maximum value
I(s) = I1(s) + I2(s) (6.16)
I1(s) =
∫ s
0
(CA((x0 − 1)e
−t + 1)y0e
−t −
α1((x0 − 1)e
−t + 1)− α2y0e
−t + a22)dt (6.17)
I2(s) =
∫ p(s)
0
(CAx1(s)y1(s)e
−2t −
α1x1(s)e
−t − α2y1(s)e
−t + a22)dt (6.18)
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Figure 5: Two families of characteristics CH = (x(·), y(·)), CH1 = (x1(·), y1(·)) in the
dual-step problem.
On Fig.5 initial position IP = (x0, y0) = (0.6, 0.9), characteristics CH = (x(·), y(·)),
CH1 = (x1(·), y1(·)), switching point SP = (x1, y1) and final point FP = (x2, y2) are
shown.
6.3 The Solution of the Two-step Optimal Control Problem
We obtain the solution of the two-step optimal control problem (6.10)-(6.18) if calculate the
derivative dI/ds, express it as the function of the optimal switching points (x, y) = (x1, y1),
equate this derivative to zero dI/ds = 0 and find the equation F (x, y) = 0 for the curve
consisting of optimal switching points (x, y).
Let us calculate at first the integrals I1, I2
I1 = I1(s) = CA(x0 − 1)y0
(1− e−2s)
2
+ CAy0(1− e
−s)−
α1((x0 − 1)(1− e
−s) + s)− α2y0(1− e
−s) + a22s
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I2 = I2(s) = CAx1(s)y1(s)
(1− e−2p(s))
2
−
α1x1(s)(1− e
−p(s))− α2y1(s)(1− e
−p(s)) + a22p(s)
Let us calculate derivatives dI1/ds, dI2/ds and express them as functions of optimal
switching points (x, y) = (x1, y1)
dI1
ds
= CA(x0 − 1)y0e
−2s + CAy0e
−s −
α1((x0 − 1)e
−s + 1)− α2y0e
−s + a22 =
CAxy − α1x− α2y + a22
dI2
ds
= CA(
dx
ds
y
(1− e−2p)
2
+
x
dy
ds
(1− e−2p)
2
+ xye−2p
dp
ds
)−
α1
dx
ds
(1− e−p)− α1xe
−p dp
ds
−
α2
dy
ds
(1− e−p)− α2ye
−p dp
ds
+ a22
dp
ds
=
(C2Ax
2y − α22y − 2C
2
Ax
3y −
2α1CAx
2 + 2α1CAx
3 + 2α2CAx
2y +
2CAa22x− 2CAa22x
2)/(2CAx
2)
In the last equation we took into account the following expressions for derivatives dx/ds,
dy/ds, dp/ds and exponentials e−p, e−2p, (1 − e−p), (1 − e−2p) as functions of variables
(x, y)
dx
ds
= 1− x
dy
ds
= −y
dp
ds
=
1− x
x
e−p =
α2
CAx
e−2p =
α22
C2Ax
2
1− e−p =
CAx− α2
CAx
1− e−2p =
C2Ax
2 − α22
C2Ax
2
Summarizing derivatives dI1/ds, dI2/ds, carrying the expression to the common denom-
inator and equating the sum to zero we obtain the following equation for the switching
curve
C2Ax
2y − 2α1CAx2 − α22y + 2CAa22x
2CAx2
= 0
Taking into account that vA = 0 (see (6.6)) we come to the final expression for the
switching curve M1A
y =
2α1x
CAx+ α2
(6.19)
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The curve M1A is a hyperbola which passes through the points (0, 0), (xA, yA) and has the
horizontal asymptote
y =
2α1
CA
Remark 6.1 The derivative of the curve M1A at the point (xA, yA) is determined by the
formula
dy
dx
=
2α1α2
(CAx+ α2)2
∣∣∣∣
x=xA
=
α1
2α2
It is less than the derivative dy/dx = α1/α2 of the switching line K
2
A, y = (α1/α2)x
(see (4.2)) in the game with the multiterminal functional. Hence, the curve M1A is situated
below the line K2A. And we can conclude that in the game with the integral functional coali-
tions have more opportunities for maneuver (optimal feedback controls are more flexible)
since individuals can keep for a longer time strategies (not switch them) which coincide
with their “local” interests determined by the gradient (∂gA/∂x, ∂gA/∂y) of the payoff
function gA(x, y) and so stay longer in preferable domains.
In order to construct the complete switching curve MA for the optimal strategy of the
first coalition in the game with the integral payoff we should add to the curve M1A the
similar curve M2A in the domain where y ≤ yA
MA = M
1
A ∪M
2
A
M1A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y =
2α1x
CAx+ α2
, y ≥
α1
CA
}
M2A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] :
y = −
2(CA − α1)(1− x)
CA(1− x) + (CA − α2)
+ 1, y ≤
α1
CA
} (6.20)
In the case when CA < 0 the curves M
1
A and M
2
A are described by formulas
M1A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y =
2α1(1− x)
CA(1− x) + (CA − α2)
, y ≥
α1
CA
}
M2A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y = −
2(CA − α1)x
CAx+ α2
+ 1, y ≤
α1
CA
} (6.21)
The curve MA divides the unit square [0, 1]× [0, 1] into two parts - the upper part
DuA ⊃ {(x, y) : x = xA, y > yA}
and the lower part
DlA ⊃ {(x, y) : x = xA, y < yA}
The “positive” feedback udsA has the following structure
udsA = u
ds
A (x, y) =


max{0,−sgn(CA)} if (x, y) ∈ D
u
A
max{0, sgn(CA)} if (x, y) ∈ DlA
∈ [0, 1] if (x, y) ∈MA
(6.22)
For the second coalition one can obtain the similar switching curvesMB for the optimal
control problem with the integral functional. Precisely, in the case when CB > 0 the
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switching curve MB is given by relations
MB = M
1
B ∪M
2
B
M1B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y =
β1x
2β2 − CBx
, x ≥
β2
CB
}
M2B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] :
y = −
(CB − β1)(1− x)
2(CB − β2)−CB(1− x)
+ 1, x ≤
β2
CB
} (6.23)
In the case when parameter CB is negative CB < 0 the curves M
1
B and M
2
B are
determined by formulas
M1B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y = −
(CB − β1)x
2β2 − CBx
+ 1, x ≥
β2
CB
}
M2B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : y =
β1(1− x)
2(CB − β2)− CB(1− x)
, x ≤
β2
CB
} (6.24)
The curve MB divides the unit square [0, 1]× [0, 1] into two parts - the left part
DlB ⊃ {(x, y) : x < xB, y = yB}
and the right part
DrB ⊃ {(x, y) : x > xB, y = yB}
The “positive” feedback vdsB has the following structure
vdsB = v
ds
B (x, y) =


max{0,−sgn(CB)} if (x, y) ∈ D
l
B
max{0, sgn(CB)} if (x, y) ∈ DrB
∈ [0, 1] if (x, y) ∈MB
(6.25)
On Fig.6 switching curves MA, MB are shown for matrixes A (4.13), B (4.14). Direc-
tions of velocities x˙ are depicted by horizontal (left and right) arrows and directions of
velocities y˙ - by vertical (up and down) arrows.
6.4 Values Guaranteed by Optimal Feedbacks in the Problem with the
Integral Payoffs
Let us formulate the statement which affirms that the “positive” optimal feedback control
udsA (x, y) (6.22) with the switching curve MA determined by formulas (6.20),(6.21) guar-
antees that the averaged value of the integral functional is more or equal than the value
vA = DA/CA of the static matrix game.
Proposition 6.2 For any initial position (x0, y0) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] and for any trajectory
(xds(·), yds(·)) ∈ X(x0, y0, u
ds
A ), x
ds(t0) = x0, y
ds(t0) = y0, t0 = 0
generated by the optimal feedback control udsA = u
ds
A (x, y) there exists a finite moment
t∗ ∈ [0, TA] such that at this moment the trajectory (xds(·), yds(·)) comes to the line where
x = xA, i.e. x
ds(t∗) = xA. Then according to construction of optimal feedback control u
ds
A
(it maximizes the integral (6.16)) the following estimate holds
∫ T
t∗
gA(x
ds(t), yds(t))dt ≥ vA(T − t∗), ∀T ≥ t∗ (6.26)
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Figure 6: Guaranteeing dual-step synthesis udsA , v
ds
B for integral payoffs and the Nash
equilibrium trajectory TR = (xds(·), yds(·)).
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In particular, this inequality remains valid when time T tends to infinity
lim inf
T→+∞
1
(T − t∗)
∫ T
t∗
gA(x
ds(t), yds(t))dt ≥ vA (6.27)
Inequalities (6.26),(6.27) mean that the averaged value of the integral functional is not
worse than the value vA of the static matrix game.
The analogous result is valid for trajectories generated by optimal control vdsB (6.25)
corresponding to the switching curve MB (6.23),(6.24).
Remark 6.2 Consider the acceptable trajectory (xdsAB(·), y
ds
AB(·)) generated by “positive”
feedbacks udsA (6.22), v
ds
B (6.25). Then according to Proposition 6.2 the following inequal-
ities take place
lim inf
T→+∞
1
(T − t∗)
∫ T
t∗
gA(x
ds
AB(t), y
ds
AB(t))dt ≥ vA (6.28)
lim inf
T→+∞
1
(T − t∗)
∫ T
t∗
gA(x
ds
AB(t), y
ds
AB(t))dt ≥ vB (6.29)
and hence the acceptable trajectory (xdsAB(·), y
ds
AB(·)) provides better results for both coali-
tions than trajectories leading to points of static Nash equilibrium at which corresponding
payoffs are equal to values vA and vB .
On Fig.6 the acceptable trajectory TR = (xdsAB(·), y
ds
AB(·)) is shown for the game with
the payoffmatrixesA (4.13) and B (4.14). It starts from the initial position IP = (0.8, 0.2)
and moves at first along the straight line to the corner (0, 0) of the unit square [0, 1]× [0, 1]
with control signals u = 0, v = 0. Then it crosses the switching line MB and the second
coalition switches its control v from 0 to 1. Further the trajectory TR moves to the corner
(0, 1) till the meeting with the switching line MA. Here the first coalition changes its
signal u from 0 to 1. After that the trajectory directs to the corner (1, 1). Next it meets
the switching line MB and turns to the corner (1, 0). Then it intersects the switching line
MA and again as at the beginning moves to the corner (0, 0). In the process of this cycling
the trajectory TR converges to the point IS =MA
⋂
MB of intersection of the switching
curves MA, MB.
7 Quasioptimal Feedback Controls in Games with the Coor-
dinated “Long-Term” and “Short-Term” Interests of Pop-
ulations and Individuals
7.1 Three-Step Optimal Control Problems
In this section we examine the three-step optimal control problem for the first coalition
when control parameter u is coordinated with “short-term” interests of individuals. The
coordination means that components x˙, y˙ of velocity vector of the system (1.1) should
have the same sign as components of gradients ∂gA/∂x and ∂gB/∂y.
In Sections 7.1, 7.2 we find solutions for auxiliary three-step optimal control problems.
Then we construct switching curves NA (7.22),(7.23), LA (7.24), NB (7.26),(7.27), LB
(7.28) for “positive” triple-step feedbacks u0A = u
ts
A(x, y) (7.25), v
0
B = v
ts
B (x, y) (7.29)
maximizing integral payoff functionals (6.1),(6.2) in presense of additional restrictions on
control parameters u and v. Substituting “positive” feedbacks utsA (7.25), v
ts
B (7.29) into
dynamics (1.1) we obtain the acceptable trajectory (xtsAB(·), y
ts
AB(·)) which forms the basis
of a dynamical Nash equilibrium.
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Let us turn our attention to the three-step optimal control problem. We assume that
there are restrictions P (x, y) on control parameter u which depend on the sign of the
partial derivative ∂gA/∂x of the payoff function gA expressing “short-term” interests of
individuals
P (x, y) = {u : x ≤ u ≤ 1 if
∂gA
∂x
= CAy − α1 ≥ 0,
0 ≤ u ≤ x if
∂gA
∂x
= CAy − α1 < 0} (7.1)
In other words the following “noncontradictory” relations are valid for restrictions P (x, y)
and “short-term” interests gA(x, y)
max
u∈P (x,y)
∂gA
∂x
u ≥ 0, (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]
Actions v = v(t) of the second coalition satisfy inequalities
0 ≤ v ≤ 1 (7.2)
and can be the most unfavorable.
Thus, we analyze the optimal control problem with the payoff functional
JfA =
∫ Tf
0
gA(x(t), y(t))dt (7.3)
on trajectories (x(t), y(t)) of the dynamical system (1.1) starting from initial position
x(0) = x0, y(0) = y0 and generated by controls u(·), v(·) satisfying restrictions (7.1),(7.2).
The terminal instant Tf = Tf(x0, y0) in formula (7.3) will be specified below.
We consider the case when initial positions (x0, y0) satisfy relations
x0 = xA, y0 > yA (7.4)
Let us suppose that actions of the second coalition are the most unfavorable. For tra-
jectories of the system (1.1) starting from initial positions (x0, y0) (7.4) these actions
v0A = v
cl
A(x, y) are determined by formula
vtsA (x, y) ≡ 0 (7.5)
The optimal actions utsA = u
ts
A(x, y) of the first coalition which maximize the payoff func-
tional JfA are constructed as the three-step bang-bang control
utsA (t) = u
ts
A(x(t), y(t)) =


1 if t0 ≤ t < s
x(s) if s ≤ t < TyA
0 if TyA ≤ t < Tf
(7.6)
The parameter s here is the parameter of optimization. The switching instant TyA is the
moment when the trajectory (x(·), y(·)) crosses the line y = yA, i.e. y(TyA) = yA, and the
final instant Tf is determined by the condition that the trajectory (x(·), y(·)) comes back
to the line x = xA, i.e. x(Tf) = xA.
So we consider three collections of characteristics. Characteristics of the first collection
satisfy the system of differential equations
x˙ = −x+ 1
y˙ = −y (7.7)
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and can be represented by the Cauchy formula
x(t) = (x0 − 1)e
−t + 1
y(t) = y0e
−t, 0 ≤ t ≤ s (7.8)
where initial positions (x0, y0) satisfy conditions (7.4) and the first switching instant s is
the parameter of optimization.
The second aggregate of characteristics is determined by the system of differential
equations
x˙ = 0
y˙ = −y (7.9)
solutions of which are determined by the Cauchy formula
x(t) = x
y(t) = ye−t, 0 ≤ t ≤ p(s) (7.10)
Initial positions (x, y) = (x(s), y(s)) are determined by relations
x = x(s) = (x0 − 1)e
−s + 1
y = y(s) = y0e
−s (7.11)
The second switching instant p = p(s) and the position (x(p), y(p)) of the characteristic
(7.10) are given by formulas
ye−p = yA =
α1
CA
, p = p(s) = ln
CAy(s)
α1
x(p) = x
y(p) = yA (7.12)
The third collection of characteristics is given by the system of differential equations
x˙ = −x
y˙ = −y (7.13)
and are determined by the Cauchy formula
x(t) = xe−t
y(t) = yAe
−t, 0 ≤ t ≤ r(s) (7.14)
Here the final instant r = r(s) and the final position (x(r), y(r)) of the characteristic
trajectory (7.14) are given by formulas
xe−r = xA =
α2
CA
, r = r(s) = ln
CAx(s)
α2
x(r) = xA
y(r) = yAe
−r (7.15)
The optimal control problem consists in finding such time s and corresponding switch-
ing point (x, y) = (x(s), y(s)) on the trajectory (x(·), y(·)) that the integral I = I(s)
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Figure 7: Three families of characteristics TR1, TR2, TR3 in the triple-step problem.
attains the maximum value
I(s) = I1(s) + I2(s) + I3(s) (7.16)
I1(s) =
∫ s
0
(CA((x0 − 1)e
−t + 1)y0e
−t −
α1((x0 − 1)e
−t + 1)− α2y0e
−t + a22)dt (7.17)
I2(s) =
∫ p(s)
0
(CAx(s)y(s)e
−t −
α1x(s)− α2y(s)e
−t + a22)dt (7.18)
I3(s) =
∫ r(s)
0
(CAx(s)yAe
−2t −
α1x(s)e
−t − α2yAe
−t + a22)dt (7.19)
On Fig.7 initial position IP = (0.6, .09), characteristics of three different types TR1
(7.8), TR2 (7.10), TR3 (7.14), switching points SP1 = (x(s), y(s)), SP2 = (x(p), y(p))
and final point FP = (x(r), y(r)) are shown.
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7.2 Solution of the Three-step Optimal Control Problem
Let us indicate the scheme for solution of the three-step optimal control problem (7.7)-
(7.19). We express integrals Ik, k = 1, 2, 3 as functions Ik(x, x0, y0) depending on the first
coordinate x of optimal switching points (x, y) = (x(s), y(s)) and initial positions (x0, y0),
calculate the derivative by the variable x of the integral I(x, x0, y0)
I(x, x0, y0) = I1(x, x0, y0) + I2(x, x0, y0) + I3(x, x0, y0)
equate this derivative to zero dI/dx = 0 and find the equation F (x, x0, y0) = 0 for optimal
switching coordinates x. Then we connect initial positions (x0, y0) with the switching posi-
tions (x, y) by corresponding relations and obtain the equation F (x, x0(x, y), y0(x, y)) = 0.
for the optimal switching curve.
So, we calculate at first the integrals I1, I2, I3 as functions of variables x, x0, y0
I1 = I1(x, x0, y0) =
CAy0((x0 − 1)
2 − (x− 1)2)
2(x0 − 1)
+
CAy0(x0 − x)
(x0 − 1)
−
α1((x0 − x) + ln(1− x0)− ln(1− x))−
α2y0(x0 − x)
(x0 − 1)
+
a22(ln(1− x0)− ln(1− x))
I2 = I2(x, x0, y0) =
(CAx− α2)(CAy0(x− 1)− α1(x0 − 1))
CA(x0 − 1)
+
(a22 − α1x)(ln
CAy0
α1(1− x0)
+ ln(1− x))
I3 = I3(x, x0, y0) =
α1(α
2
2 − C
2
Ax
2)
2C2Ax
+ a22(lnx+ ln
CA
α2
)
Now we calculate derivatives dI1/dx, dI2/dx, dI3/dx
dI1
dx
= −
y0(CAx− α2)
(x0 − 1)
+
(α1x− a22)
(x− 1)
dI2
dx
=
(CAy0(x− 1)− α1(x0 − 1) +CAy0x − α2y0)
(x0 − 1)
−
α1(ln
CAy0
α1(1− x0)
+ ln(1− x)) +
(a22 − α1x)
(x− 1)
dI3
dx
= −
α1(C
2
Ax
2 + α22)
2C2Ax
2
+
a22
x
Summarizing derivatives dI1/dx, dI2/dx, dI3/dx and equating the sum to zero we obtain
the following equation
CAy0(1− x)
(1− x0)
− α1 − α1 ln
CAy0(1− x)
α1(1− x0)
−
(α1C
2
Ax
2 − 2C2Aa22x+ α1α
2
2)
2C2Ax
2
= 0
Taking into account that vA = a22CA−α1α2 = 0 in (6.6), and parameters x, y, x0, y0 are
connected by formula
y =
y0(1− x)
(1− x0)
we obtain the expression for the switching curve N 1A
(CAy − α1)
α1
− ln(1 +
(CAy − α1)
α1
)−
(CAx− α2)
2
2C2Ax
2
= 0 (7.20)
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The curve N 1A with the accuracy of the second order with respect to variable y is a
hyperbola which passes through the point (xA, yA)
(CAy − α1)
α1
−
(CAx− α2)
CAx
= 0 (7.21)
It has the horizontal asymptote
y =
2α1
CA
and the vertical asymptote
x = 0
Remark 7.1 The derivative of the curve N1A at the point (xA, yA) is determined by rela-
tion
dy
dx
=
α1α2
C2Ax
2
∣∣∣∣∣
x=xA
=
α1
α2
It is equal to the derivative dy/dx = α1/α2 of the switching line K
2
A, y = (α1/α2)x (see
(4.2)) in the game with the multiterminal functional. Hence, the curve N 1A is situated
below the line K2A.
To construct the complete switching curve NA for the optimal strategy of the first
coalition we need to supplement the curve N 1A by the analogous curve N
2
A in the domain
where y ≤ yA
NA = N
1
A ∪N
2
A
N 1A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] :
(CAy − α1)
α1
− ln(1 +
(CAy − α1)
α1
)−
(CAx− α2)
2
2C2Ax
2
= 0, y ≥
α1
CA
}
N 2A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] :
(CA(1− y)− (CA − α1))
(CA − α1)
− ln(1 +
(CA(1− y)− (CA − α1))
(CA − α1)
)−
(CA(1− x)− (CA − α2))2
2C2A(1− x)
2
= 0, y ≤
α1
CA
} (7.22)
In the case when CA < 0 the curves N
1
A and N
2
A are described by formulas
N1A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] :
(CAy − α1)
α1
− ln(1 +
(CAy − α1)
α1
)−
(CA(1− x)− (CA − α2))2
2C2A(1− x)
2
= 0, y ≥
α1
CA
}
N 2A = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] :
(CA(1− y)− (CA − α1))
(CA − α1)
− ln(1 +
(CA(1− y)− (CA − α1))
(CA − α1)
)−
(CAx− α2)2
2C2Ax
2
= 0, y ≤
α1
CA
} (7.23)
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Let us remind that the line
LA = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, y = yA} (7.24)
is also the switching one for the first coalition according to (7.6). The curves NA, LA
divide the unit square [0, 1]× [0, 1] into three parts - the upper part
SuA ⊃ {(x, y) : x = xA, y > yA}
the lower part
SlA ⊃ {(x, y) : x = xA, y < yA}
and the middle part
SmA = S
m1
A
⋃
Sm2A
Sm1A ⊃ {(x, y) : x < xA, y = yA}
Sm2A ⊃ {(x, y) : x > xA, y = yA}
The “positive” feedback utsA has the following structure
utsA = u
ts
A(x, y) =


max{0,−sgn(CA)} if (x, y) ∈ S
u
A
max{0, sgn(CA)} if (x, y) ∈ SlA
x if (x, y) ∈ SmA
∈ [0, x] or ∈ [x, 1] if (x, y) ∈ NA
⋃
LA
(7.25)
For the second coalition one can obtain the similar switching curves NB. Namely, in
the case when CB > 0 the switching curve NB is given by relations
NB = N
1
B ∪N
2
B
N 1B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] :
(CBx − β2)
β2
− ln(1 +
(CBx− β2)
β2
)−
(CBy − β1)
2
2C2By
2
= 0, x ≥
β2
CB
}
N 2B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] :
(CB(1− x)− (CB − β2))
(CB − β2)
− ln(1 +
(CB(1− x)− (CB − β2))
(CB − β2)
)−
(CB(1− y)− (CB − β1))2
2C2B(1− y)
2
= 0, x ≤
β2
CB
} (7.26)
In the case when CB < 0 the curves N
1
B and N
2
B are determined by formulas
N 1B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] :
(CBx − β2)
β2
− ln(1 +
(CBx− β2)
β2
)−
(CB(1− y)− (CB − β1))2
2C2B(1− y)
2
= 0, x ≥
β2
CB
}
N 2B = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] :
(CB(1− x)− (CB − β2))
(CB − β2)
− ln(1 +
(CB(1− x)− (CB − β2))
(CB − β2)
)−
(CBy − β1)
2
2C2By
2
= 0, x ≤
β2
CB
} (7.27)
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Remind that the line
LB = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : x = xB, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1} (7.28)
is also the switching one for the second coalition. The curves NB, LB divide the unit
square [0, 1]× [0, 1] into three parts - the left part
SlB ⊃ {(x, y) : x < xB, y = yB}
the right part
SrB ⊃ {(x, y) : x > xB, y = yB}
and the middle part
SmB = S
m1
B
⋃
Sm2B
Sm1B ⊃ {(x, y) : x = xB , y < yB}
Sm2B ⊃ {(x, y) : x = xB , y > yB}
The “positive” feedback vtsB has the following structure
vtsB = v
ts
B (x, y) =


max{0,−sgn(CB)} if (x, y) ∈ SlB
max{0, sgn(CB)} if (x, y) ∈ S
r
B
y if (x, y) ∈ SmB
∈ [0, y] or ∈ [y, 1] if (x, y) ∈ NB
⋃
LB
(7.29)
On Fig.8 switching curves N 1A, N
2
A, LA and N
1
B, N
2
B, LB are shown for matrixes A
(4.13), B (4.14). Directions of velocities x˙ are depicted by horizontal arrows: left arrows -
in the upper domain SuA, right arrows - in the lower domain S
l
A, left-right arrows - in the
middle domain SmA . Directions of velocities y˙ are indicated by vertical arrows: up arrows
- in the left domain SlB, down arrows - in the right domain S
r
B , up-down arrows - in the
middle domain SmB .
7.3 The Guaranteed Value in the Three-Step Optimal Control Problem
Generalizing the considered three-step optimal control problem we can formulate the result
which arises from the optimization nature of this problem and provides better index values
than values of trajectories tending to static Nash equilibria.
Proposition 7.1 Consider three-step optimal control utsA(x, y) (7.25) with the switching
curves NA (7.22),(7.23), LA (7.24). Then for any initial position (x0, y0) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]
and for any trajectory
(xts(·), yts(·)) ∈ X(x0, y0, u
ts
A), x
ts(t0) = x0, y
ts(t0) = y0, t0 = 0
generated by the optimal feedback control utsA = u
ts
A (x, y) there exists a finite moment
t∗ ∈ [0, TA] such that at this moment the trajectory (xts(·), yts(·)) comes to the line where
x = xA. Then according to construction of three-step optimal feedback control u
ts
A (it
maximizes the integral (7.16) and conforms to “short-term” interests of individuals) the
following estimate holds
∫ T
t∗
gA(x
ts(t), yts(t))dt ≥ vA(T − t∗), ∀T ≥ t∗ (7.30)
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Figure 8: Guaranteeing triple-step design utsA , v
ts
B for integral payoffs and the Nash equi-
librium trajectory TR = (xts(·), yts(·)).
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In particular, this inequality remains valid when time T tends to infinity
lim inf
T→+∞
1
(T − t∗)
∫ T
t∗
gA(x
ts(t), yts(t))dt ≥ vA (7.31)
Inequalities (7.30),(7.31) mean that the averaged value of the integral functional is not
worse than the value vA of the static matrix game.
The analogous result is valid for trajectories generated by three-step optimal control vtsB
(7.29) corresponding to the switching curves NB (7.26),(7.27), LB (7.28).
Remark 7.2 Consider the acceptable trajectory (xtsAB(·), y
ts
AB(·)) generated by “positive”
three-step feedbacks utsA (7.25), v
ts
B (7.29). Then according to Proposition 7.1 the following
inequalities take place
lim inf
T→+∞
1
(T − t∗)
∫ T
t∗
gA(x
ts
AB(t), y
ts
AB(t))dt ≥ vA (7.32)
lim inf
T→+∞
1
(T − t∗)
∫ T
t∗
gA(x
ts
AB(t), y
ts
AB(t))dt ≥ vB (7.33)
and hence the acceptable trajectory (xtsAB(·), y
ts
AB(·)) provides better results for both coali-
tions than trajectories leading to points of static Nash equilibrium at which corresponding
payoffs are equal to values vA and vB .
On Fig.8 the acceptable trajectory TR = (xtsAB(·), y
ts
AB(·)) is shown for the game with
the payoff matrixes A (4.13) and B (4.14). It starts from the initial position IP =
(0.6, 0.75) and moves at first along the straight line to the corner (1, 0) of the unit square
[0, 1]× [0, 1] with control signals u = 1, v = 0. Then it crosses the switching line N 1A and
the first coalition switches its control u from 1 to x. Further the trajectory TR moves
down along the straight line parallel to the axis y till the meeting with the switching line
LA. Here the first coalition changes its signal u from x to 0. After that the trajectory
directs to the corner (0, 0). Next it meets the switching line N 1B and the second coalition
changes its control signal from 0 to y. Then the trajectory TR moves to the left along the
straight line parallel to the axis x and intersects the switching curve N 2A. On this curve
the first coalition changes its control signal u from 0 to x. The trajectory TR stops here
at point FP because velocities are equal to zero x˙ = 0, y˙ = 0.
Conclusion
In this paper we introduce the control generalization of evolutionary dynamics described
by Kolmogorov’s differential equations choosing coefficients of flows on the feedback prin-
ciple. It is shown that in arising evolutionary (dynamical) nonzero sum games “positive”
maximizing feedbacks (guaranteeing feedbacks) provide better results than trajectories
which tend to (or circulate near) static Nash equilibria. We construct these “positive”
feedbacks analytically for different (terminal, integral) types of functionals determined on
infinite horizon. Feedbacks are calculated via methods of the theory of generalized solu-
tions (value functions for corresponding differential games) of Hamilton-Jacobi equations
and have bang-bang properties on switching curves. We use multiterminal payoffs which
depend on future states and so take into account the foreseeing principle. It is proved
that equilibrium trajectories generated by guaranteeing feedbacks are located in domains
with better index values for both coalitions than at static Nash equilibria. We indicate
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the “evolutionary-revolutionary” properties of equilibrium trajectories and show exam-
ples when these trajectories converge to points of intersection of switching curves with
the strictly better index values. The risk barrier surrounding the equilibrium trajectory is
intended for considering the venturous factor. We give an appropriate economical model
for justification of dynamics, payoffs, optimal feedbacks, dynamical Nash equilibria and
equilibrium trajectories.
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